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DEAD MEN REPRODUCING:· RESPONDING TO 
THE EXISTENCE OF AFTERDEATH CHILDREN 
Browne C. Lewis .. 
INTRODUCTION 
403 
On September 11, 2008, the Third District of the California Appellate 
Court held that Iris Kievernagel could not use her dead husband's sperm to 
conceive his child. 1 Even after Joseph was killed in a helicopter accident in 
July 2005, Iris held out hope that she would conceive Joseph's child. 2 Iris's 
dream started in a California fertility clinic years before Joseph died. 
After ten years of marriage, Joseph and Iris Kievernagel decided to 
have a child using in vitro fertilization ("IVF"). Consequently, the couple 
went to the Northern California Fertility Medical Center, Inc. 3 The Center 
arranged for Iris to be inseminated with Joseph's sperm. As a part of the 
process, the Center froze a sample of Joseph's sperm to use as back-up in 
case the insemination with the live sperm was unsuccessful. 4 At that time, 
the Center required Joseph to sign an IVF Back-up Sperm Storage and Con-
sent Agreement ("Agreement"). 5 Joseph signed the consent form after Iris 
filled it out. With regard to the disposition of the sperm upon his death, 
Joseph opted to have the Center discard the frozen sperm instead of author-
izing the Center to release it to Iris. 6 
After Joseph's death, Iris petitioned the probate court for an order to 
require the fertility center to give her the vial containing Joseph's sperm. 7 
• This title was inspired by DEAD MAN WALKING (Havoc/Working Title Films), the 1995 movie 
starring Susan Sarandon and Sean Penn. 
•• Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University; 
B.A., Grambling State University; J.D., University of Minnesota School of Law; M.P.A., Hubert Hum-
phrey Institute of Public Affairs; L.L.M., University of Houston College of Law. I would like to give 
special thanks to Dean Geoffrey Mearns and the faculty of Cleveland-Marshall for the research support 
provided to assist in the completion of this Article. I would also like to thank the following persons for 
their research assistance and comments: Marc Silverman, the Research Fellows at the University of 
Pittsburgh School of Law, Professor Robert Harper, Professor Sandra Jordan, Professor Jennifer Martin, 
Professor Andrew Moore, and Professor Bonita Gardner. 






7 Kievernagel, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 312. 
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However, Joseph's parents objected. 8 They contended that their son never 
intended to have his sperm used to father a child after his death. Joseph's 
parents used the signed Agreement to bolster their argument. 9 Relying upon 
the Agreement, the probate court concluded that "Joseph's intent was to 
stop the fertility process upon his death by discarding his frozen sperm." 10 
Iris's story is not unique. It is the story of many women who would 
like to retain some part of the men they love. More women are choosing to 
conceive babies with the use of their deceased husbands' or significant oth-
ers' sperm. This practice is becoming common among spouses of men 
killed in Iraq. For example, an attorney for Kynesha Dhanoolal filed an 
emergency motion for a temporary restraining order to prevent the military 
from embalming her husband, Dayne Darren Dhanoolal, before she could 
have some of his sperm removed. 11 Dayne died on March 31, 2008 from 
injuries he suffered as a result of an explosion in Baghdad. Kynesha plans 
to be artificially inseminated with Dayne's sperm. 12 In addition, this phe-
nomenon has not been limited to women who want to conceive children 
using the sperm of dead men. For instance, in 2007, the parents of a dead 
Israeli soldier successfully petitioned the court for the right to have their 
son's sperm used to inseminate a woman they chose to carry their grand-
child.13 The case was unique because the couple's son, Kevin Cohen, was 
killed by a sniper in Gaza in 2002, and he never knew the woman who 
would have his child. 14 
The cases involving persons seeking the right to use the sperm of dead 
men to reproduce are increasing. However, the desire to conceive posthu-
mously is not a new occurrence. One of the first cases of a woman seeking 
to obtain the sperm of a dead man occurred in France in 1984, when 
Corinne Parpalaix went to court to get custody of her dead husband's 
sperm. 15 Prior to undergoing chemotherapy to treat testicular cancer, Alain 
Parpalaix deposited his sperm in a government-operated sperm bank. 16 He 
8 Id 
9 Id 
IO Id at 313. The district court affirmed the probate court's decision. Id at 318. 
11 Pl.'s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Her Emergency Mot. for a TRO at 2, Dhanoolal v. U.S. Dep't of 
the Army, No. 4:08-CV-42(CDL) (M.D. Ga. Apr. 4, 2008). 
12 Id at 1-2; see also WSBTV.com, Wife, Mother Declare Truce over Deceased Soldier's Body 
(Apr. 7, 2008), http://www.wsbtv.com/news/15810463/detail.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2008). 
13 FOXNews.com, Israeli Court Allows Woman to be Inseminated with Dead Soldier's Sperm 
Without his Written Consent (Jan. 18, 2007), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,244404,00.html 
(last visited Nov. 6, 2008). 
14 Id 
15 The factual information about this case was taken from a detailed discussion of the case in a 
groundbreaking article. E. Donald Shapiro & Benedene Sonnenblick, The Widow and the Sperm: The 
Law of Post-Mortem Insemination, I J.L. & HEAL TH 229, 230 (1986). 
16 Id at229. 
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did not consent to the future use of his sperm. 17 At the time he made the 
sperm donation, Alain was not married to Corinne. 18 When Alain's health 
deteriorated, he married Corinne. He died two days after the marriage. 19 
Then, Corinne contacted the sperm bank and asked the bank to release 
Alain's sperm. 20 She intended to be artificially inseminated with Alain's 
sperm in order to have his child. 21 After the sperm bank denied her request, 
Corinne filed a successful court action to get the sperm. 22 The French Par-
liament responded to this case by placing restrictions on posthumous repro-
duction. 23 
A case with similar facts came before a California court in 1993. 24 In 
Hecht v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Ellen Hecht, the girlfriend 
of William Kane, wanted to use his sperm to become pregnant after his 
death. 25 Kane and Hecht lived together for several years before his death, 
but never married. 26 In October 1991, Kane deposited fifteen vials of his 
sperm with a California sperm bank. 27 Later that month, Kane committed 
suicide leaving a will bequeathing his sperm to Hecht. 28 In his will, Kane 
expressed the hope that Hecht would use the sperm to conceive his child. 29 
Over the objections of Kane's adult children, Hecht got a court order to 
prevent the destruction of the sperm and to enforce the settlement agree-
ment that permitted her to receive five vials of Kane's sperm. 30 
After Hecht, American courts were confronted with cases involving 
children who were actually conceived using the sperm of deceased men. 31 
The cases came before the courts because the mothers of the posthumously 
conceived children wanted them to be awarded Social Security Surviving 
Children's benefits. 32 In each case, the court concluded the child was only 
eligible for Social Security benefits if he or she were entitled to inherit from 
17 Id. at 229-30. 
18 Id at 230. 
19 Id 
20 Id. 
21 Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 15, at 230. 
22 Id. 
23 See Nicole Zwart-Hendrix, Chilling Aspects of Procreation, 21 MED. & L. 567, 569 (2002) 
(citing ART. L. 152-2 of the CODE DE LA SANTE PUBLIQUE). 
24 Hecht v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). 
25 Id at 277-78. 
26 Id at 276. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 277. 
30 Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 278-79, 291. 
31 See infra Part II. 
32 Id. 
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the deceased man under the state's intestacy system. 33 Thus, the courts had 
to review the intestacy laws of the states where the actions were filed. The 
courts handling those cases expressed a desire to have the state legislatures 
set forth guidelines to deal with the existence of posthumously conceived 
children. 34 
The law has not kept up with the advances in reproductive technol-
ogy. 35 The existence of posthumously conceived children has the potential 
to significantly impact the distribution of a man's estate. 36 If a man dies 
with a validly executed will leaving his estate to his children, the question 
becomes whether posthumously conceived children should be included in 
the definition of "children."37 In the event a man dies without a will, the 
question to be resolved is whether posthumously conceived children should 
be considered heirs under the intestacy system. 38 The status of posthu-
mously conceived children will also influence the distribution of certain 
government benefits, including Social Security.39 
The portion of the decedent's property not disposed of by will is cov-
ered by the intestacy system. 40 The intestacy system is a default system for 
the distribution of property after death. 41 In all fifty states and the District of 
Columbia, intestate succession is governed by a statutory scheme. 42 Tradi-
tionally, regulating the disposal of real and personal property has been the 
33 See Joseph H. Karlin, Comment, "Daddy Can You Spare a Dime?": Intestate Heir Rights of 
Posthumously Conceived Children, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1317, 1320-30 (2006) (discussing key cases); see 
also Finley v. Astrue, 372 Ark. I 03, I 04-06 (2008). 
34 See, e.g., Khabbaz v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 930 A.2d 1180, 1189 (N.H. 2007); In re 
Martin 8., 841 N.Y.S.2d 207, 212 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2007) ("[T]hcre is a need for comprehensive legisla-
tion to resolve the issues raised by advances in biotechnology. Accordingly, copies of this decision are 
being sent to the respective Chairs of the Judiciary Committee of the New York State Senate and As-
sembly."). These cases are discussed in detail in Parts II.C-D. See also Christie E. Kirk, Assisted Repro-
duction: Children Conceived Posthumously Entitled to Inheritance Rights, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 109, 
110 (2002). 
35 See Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 15, at 233 (citing E. Donald Shapiro, New Innovations 
in Conception and Their Effects upon Our Law and Morality, 31 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 37, 38-39, 59 
(1986) (discussing the law's failure to adapt to changes caused by advances in the use of artificial in-
semination)). 
36 See Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 266 (Mass. 2002) ("Any inheritance 
rights of posthumously conceived children will reduce the intestate share available to children born prior 
to the decedent's death."). 
37 See Brianne M. Star, A Matter a/Life and Death: Posthumous Conception, 64 LA. L. REV. 613, 
615-20 (2004) (discussing reasons posthumously conceived children usually do not fit the definition of 
"children"). 
38 Margaret Ward Scott, Comment, A Look at the Rights and Entitlements of Posthumously Con-
ceived Children: No Surefire Way to Tame the Reproductive Wild West, 52 EMORY L.J. 963, 974 (2003). 
39 Id. at 975. 
40 JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 59-60 (7th ed. 2005). 
41 Id. at 60. 
42 Id. 
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domain of the state. 43 The fact that the courts recognize a probate exception 
indicates that states are considered the primary arbiters of probate matters. 44 
As a consequence, the distribution of estates under the intestacy system is 
governed by state law. 45 
Most states have statutes dealing with the rights of children conceived 
by artificial insemination. 46 Not surprising, only a few states have statutes 
specifically addressing the inheritance rights of artificially produced chil-
dren who are conceived during the life of their fathers. 47 Even fewer state 
legislatures have enacted statutes addressing the issue of the inheritance 
rights of posthumously conceived children. 48 Reproductive technology will 
improve and, as long as the technology exists, people will continue to use 
it. 49 Hence, the number of children conceived after the deaths of their fa-
thers and mothers will probably continue to rise. 50 
The comment to Article 7, Section 703 of the Uniform Parentage Act 
("UP A") asserts that "[g]iven the dramatic increase in the use of [artificial 
insemination] in the United States during the past decade, it is crucial to 
clarify the parentage of all of the children born as a result of modem sci-
43 See generally Peter Chase, Note, The Uniform International Will: The Next Step in the Evolu-
tion of Testamentary Disposition, 6 B.U. INT'L L.J. 317, 329-30 (1988). 
44 Christian J. Grostic, Note, A Prudential Exercise: Abstention and the Probate Exception to 
Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, I 04 MICH. L. REV. 131, 132 (2005) ("At its core, the probate exception 
stands for the proposition that federal courts do not have the authority to probate wills or administer 
estates."). 
45 Id. at 133. 
46 See, e.g., ALA. CODE§ 26-17-2l(a) (2008) (repealed effective Jan. I, 2009); ALASKA STAT. 
§ 25.20.045 (2008) ("A child, born to a married woman by means of artificial insemination performed 
by a licensed physician and consented to in writing by both spouses, is considered for all purposes the 
natural and legitimate child of both spouses."); ARK. CODE ANN.§ 9-10-20l(a) (2008) ("Any child born 
to a married woman by means of artificial insemination shall be deemed the legitimate natural child of 
the woman and the woman's husband ifthe husband consents in writing to the artificial insemination."). 
47 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-5 (2008) ("An individual conceived by artificial insemination 
... shall be considered a child of the parents and entitled to inherit under the laws of intestacy from the 
parents and from relatives of the parents, and the parents and relatives of the parents shall likewise be 
entitled to inherit as heirs from and through such individual."). But see CONN. GEN. STAT.§ 45a-777(a) 
(2008) ("A child born as a result of A.I.D. may inherit the estate of his mother and her consenting 
spouse or their relatives as though he were the natural child of the mother and consenting spouse and he 
shall not inherit the estate from his natural father or his relatives."); F. Barrett Faulkner, Applying Old 
Law to New Births: Protecting the Interests of Children Born Through New Reproductive Technology, 
2 J. HIGH TECH. L. 27, 27-28 (2003). 
48 These statutes are discussed infra Part III. See Kayla VanCannon, Note, Fathering a Child from 
the Grave: What Are the Inheritance Rights of Children Born Through New Technology After the Death 
of a Parent?, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 331, 351-55 (2004) (discussing the limited legislative response to the 
existence of posthumously conceived children). 
49 ROBERT BLANK & JANNA C. MERRICK, HUMAN REPRODUCTION, EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES, 
AND CONFLICTING RIGHTS 93, 228 (Cong. Quarterly, Inc. 1995). 
5o Christopher A. Scharman, Note, Not Without My Father: The Legal Status of the Posthumously 
Conceived Child, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1001, 1006 (2002). 
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ence."51 The current law does not achieve that objective with regard to 
posthumously conceived children. To address the problem, every state 
should have a comprehensive statute that balances the interests of the dece-
dent and the state while advancing the best interest of posthumously con-
ceived children. 
If the child is successfully conceived prior to the death of his or her le-
gal father, the child is considered to be posthumous. 52 Under the Uniform 
Probate Code53 ("UPC") and every state intestacy statute, the posthumously 
born or afterbom child is entitled to inherit from his or her father to the 
same extent as children who were alive before the father's death. 54 How-
ever, the UPC has not taken into account all advances in reproductive tech-
nology, and due to certain advancements in medical science, a man's sperm 
can now be successfully frozen for up to ten years. 55 As a consequence, a 
5l UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 703 cmt. (Supp. 2008). 
52 Typically, a "posthumous child suggests one born after the father's death." BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 255 (8th ed. 2004). See also Keystone Masonry Corp. v. Hernandez, 847 A.2d 493, 510 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) ("A posthumous child is one 'born after the death of its father."' (quoting 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 233 (7th ed. 1999))). 
53 UNIF. PROBATE CODE§ 2-108 (revised 1990) ("An individual in gestation at a particular time is 
treated as living at that time if the individual lives 120 hours or more after birth."); see also Amy L. 
Komoroski, Comment, After Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Services; Where Do Posthumously 
Conceived Children Stand in the Line of Descent?, 11 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 297, 300 (2002); Erica How-
ard-Potter, Beyond Our Conception: A Look at Children Born Posthumously Through Reproductive 
Technology and New York Intestacy Law, 14 BUFF. WOMEN'S L.J. 23, 53 (2005) (citing the Uniform 
Probate Code as a commonly used model requiring a child to be "in gestation" and survive "one hun-
dred twenty hours after its birth"). 
54 See James E. Bailey, An Analytical Framework for Resolving the Issues Raised by the Interac-
tion Between Reproductive Technology and the Law of Inheritance, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 743, 796 (1998) 
("The question of intestate inheritance by a posthumous child is one of statute rather than common law 
because every state except Louisiana has codified and modified the intestate succession scheme."). See, 
e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.220 (West 2008) ("Heirs of an intestate, begotten before the intestate's 
death but born thereafter, shall inherit as if they had been born in the lifetime of the intestate and had 
survived the intestate. With this exception, the intestate succession shall be determined by the relation-
ship existing at the time of the death of the intestate."); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-21 O(a) (West 2008) 
("Posthumous descendants of the intestate conceived before his or her death but born thereafter shall 
inherit in the same manner as if born in the lifetime of the intestate."); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-6 
(West 2008) ("Descendants of the intestate, begotten before his death but born thereafter, shall inherit as 
if they had been born in the lifetime of the intestate and had survived him. With this exception, the 
descent and distribution of intestate estates shall be determined by the relationships existing at the time 
of the death of the intestate."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 505 (2008) ("Posthumous children, born alive, 
shall be considered as though living at the death of their parent."); ALA. CODE§ 43-8-47 (2008) ("Rela-
tive of the decedent conceived before his death but born thereafter inherit as if they had been born in the 
lifetime of the decedent."). 
55 Jamie Rowsell, Note, Stayin' Alive: Postmortem Reproduction and Inheritance Rights, 41 FAM. 
CT. REV. 400, 401 (2003) (citing Gloria J. Banks, Traditional Concepts and Nontraditional Concep-
tions: Social Security Survivor's Benefits for Posthumously Conceived Children, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
251, 270 (1999)); see also John A. Gibbons, Comment, Who's Your Daddy?: A Constitutional Analysis 
of Post-Mortem Insemination, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 187, 188 (1997). 
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child can be conceived many years after his or her father's death. The in-
heritance rights of these posthumously conceived children are still evolv-
ing. 56 
Every state should enact some type of comprehensive legislation that 
clarifies the inheritance rights of posthumously conceived children. There 
are several options available to state legislators. One option is for the state 
to amend its current intestacy statute to include posthumously conceived 
children in its definition of children for inheritance purposes. Another op-
tion is for the state to enact a separate statute setting forth all of the legal 
rights, including those related to inheriting under the intestacy system, to be 
afforded to posthumously conceived children. 57 A final option is for the 
state to adopt the UPA and modify it as needed to be compatible with its 
overall intestacy statutory scheme. 58 This Article discusses the policies that 
legislatures should consider when evaluating the inheritance rights of post-
humously conceived children. In addition, this Article suggests conditions 
that should be satisfied before posthumously conceived children are permit-
ted to inherit from their fathers. 
This Article addresses the inheritance rights of children conceived us-
ing the sperm of dead men. Part I briefly discusses the technology that per-
mits a child to be conceived posthumously. Part II analyzes several key 
cases that have dealt with the inheritance rights of posthumously conceived 
children. Currently, only eleven states have statutes directly addressing 
those rights. 59 Those statutes are discussed in Part III. Finally, Part IV ad-
vocates that all states should strive to adopt legislation on the issue of the 
inheritance rights of posthumously conceived children and examines the 
components that should be included in such a comprehensive intestacy stat-
ute. 
56 See Karlin, supra note 33, at 1352. In order for a child to be conceived using the eggs of a 
deceased woman, a surrogate must be involved. A discussion of the legal consequences of surrogate and 
gestational agreements is beyond the scope of this Article. 
57 This is the approach taken by some other countries. For example, Western Australia adopted 
The Human Reproductive Technology Act of 1991 to deal with posthumous reproduction. See Repro-
ductive Technology Council, The Human Reproductive Technology Act of 1991, available at 
http://www.rtc.org.au/docs/Human%20Reproductive%20Technology°/o20Act%20199 I .pdf (last visited 
Nov. 8, 2008). 
58 States have adopted uniform approaches when a situation dictates that action. For example, a 
majority of states have adopted a portion of the Uniform Probate Code, while eighteen states have 
adopted it in its entirety. Browne Lewis, Children of Men: Balancing the Inheritance Rights of Marital 
and Non-marital Children, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 3 n.12 (2007); Nowell D. Bamberger, Are Military 
Testamentary Instruments Unconstitutional? Why Compliance with State Testamentary Formality Re-
quirements Remains Essential, 196 MIL. L. REV. 91, 124 (2008). The approach of the Uniform Parent-
age Act to dealing with inheritance rights of posthumously conceived children has been adopted by 
seven states and is currently under consideration by two others. Robert M. Harper, Dead Hand Problem: 
Why New York's Estates, Powers and Trusts Law Should Be Amended to Treat Posthumously Conceived 
Children as Decedents' Issue and Descendants, 21 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J 267, 272-73 (2008). 
59 Harper, supra note 58, at 272. 
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I. ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 
Numerous types of reproductive technology are available to help infer-
tile couples achieve their dreams of having children.60 One of the oldest and 
most common forms of assisted reproduction is artificial insemination. 61 
Couples widely use artificial insemination because it is the simplest form of 
assisted reproduction. 62 The popularity of artificial insemination may also 
be attributed to the fact that it is affordable and can be safely done without 
the benefit of medical personnel. 63 Artificial insemination involves sperm 
being placed into a woman's cervix without sexual intercourse. 64 Although 
normally performed by a doctor in a medical facility, the procedure is sim-. 
ple enough that some women have artificially inseminated themselves at 
home using a turkey baster. 65 The widespread use of artificial insemination 
may be the reason why most state legislatures that have enacted statutes 
dealing with assisted reproduction have focused exclusively on artificial 
insemination. 66 
The two main types of artificial insemination differ based upon the 
source of the sperm used to inseminate the woman. If the woman's husband 
contributes the sperm that is implanted, the process is called homologous 
insemination. 67 This type of insemination may also be referred to as ho-
mologous artificial insemination ("AIH''). 68 Doctors, in a procedure known 
as heterologous insemination, sometimes use sperm donated by a man who 
is not the woman's husband to inseminate the woman. 69 Another source of 
sperm has become available to women-the dead male body. 70 State legis-
60 Kristin L. Antall, Who is My Mother?: Why States Should Ban Posthumous Reproduction by 
Women, 9 HEALTH MATRIX 203, 206-11 (1999); see also Ellen J. Garside, Comment, Posthumous 
Progeny: A Proposed Resolution to the Dilemma of the Posthumously Conceived Child, 41 LOY. L. 
REV. 713, 713-14 (1996). 
61 BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 49, at 86-87. 
62 Cyrene Grothaus-Day, From Pipette to Cradle, from Immortality to Extinction, 7 RUTGERS J.L. 
& RELIGION 2, 2-3 (2005). 
63 Audra Elizabeth Laabs, Lesbian Art, 19 LAW & INEQ. 65, 81 (200 I). 
64 MARCIA MOBILIA BOUMIL, LAW, ETHICS AND REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE 5 (Fred B. Rothman & 
Co. 1994). 
65 Laurence C. Nolan, Critiquing Society's Response to the Needs of Posthumously Conceived 
Children, 82 OR. L. REV. 1067, 1069 n.9 (2003) (citing Daniel Wikler & Norma J. Wikler, Turkey-
Baster Babies: The Demedicalization of Artificial Insemination, 69 MILBANK Q. 5, 5 (1991)). 
66 See Helene S. Shapo, Matters of Life and Death: Inheritance Consequences of Reproductive 
Technologies, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1091, 1102 (1997). 
67 Cindy L. Steeb, Note, A Child Conceived after His Father's Death?: Posthumous Reproduction 
and Inheritance Rights: An Analysis of Ohio Statutes, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 137, 140 (2000). 
68 Id 
69 Karin Mika & Bonnie Hurst, One Way to Be Born? Legislative Inaction and the Posthumous 
Child, 79 MARQ. L. REY. 993, 997 (1996). 
70 In 1997, the director of the Center for Bioethics at the University of Pennsylvania, Dr. Arthur 
Caplan, teamed up with several colleagues to conduct a study of fertility clinics to determine if they had 
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lators have largely ignored the legal repercussions of this new supply of 
sperm, and thus, the laws surrounding posthumously conceived children 
remain uncertain. 
In deciding how to divide a man's estate when he dies intestate, the 
probate court has a directive to carry out his presumed intent. 71 The pre-
sumption is that, after his spouse has received her share, a reasonable man 
would want the remainder of his assets divided among his children. 72 Thus, 
the probate system favors children. 73 The courts and state legislatures have 
recognized that equity mandates that non-marital children should be able to 
inherit from their fathers on an equal par with marital children. 74 However, 
those bodies must now deal with the existence of a new class of children-
children born as the result of artificial insemination using the genetic mate-
rial of their deceased fathers. Because the law holds that death ends a mar-
riage, it would be reasonable for the law to treat posthumously conceived 
children as if they are non-marital children. 75 This would bring clarity to the 
situation because every state has an intestacy statute specifically dealing 
with the inheritance rights of non-marital children. 76 Nonetheless, the courts 
and legislatures that have tackled the issue have decided not to follow that 
path. 77 
removed sperm from dead men. The results of the study indicated that the practice of removing and 
storing the sperm of dead men was becoming more common. Gina Kolata, Uncertain Area for Doctors: 
Saving Sperm of Dead Men, N.Y. DMES, May 30, 1997, at Al, available at http://query.nytimes. 
com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9EODEFDAJ03AF933A05756COA961958260. See also Should Dead Men's 
Sperm Be Stored?, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 8, 1997, at JD (discussing cases of widows having sperm 
extracted from the corpses of their dead husbands); Graham Tibbetts, Widow Fights for Baby by Dead 
Husband, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), May 20, 2008, at 4 (discussing a forty-two-year-old English 
woman who went to court to get permission to have a child using the sperm she had extracted from her 
dead husband), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/l 988585/Widow-launches-legal-fight-for-
child-using-husbands-sperm.html; Evelyn Harvey, Widow Fights for Right to Use Late Husband's 
Sperm to Conceive, BioNews, May 26, 2008, http://www.bionews.org.uk/new.lasso?storyid=3848 
(discussing case involving Diane Blood, who successfully fought for the right to use her comatose 
husband's sperm to conceive a child). 
71 Susan N. Gary, The Parent-Child Relationship Under Intestacy Statutes, 32 U. MEM. L. REV. 
643, 651 (2002) (citing LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 37 (3d ed. 2002)); see also Melissa B. Vegter, 
Note, The "Art" of Inheritance: A Proposal for Legislation Requiring Proof of Parental Intent Before 
Posthumously Conceived Children Can Inherit from a Deceased Parent's Estate, 38 VAL. U. L. REv. 
267, 299 (2003). 
72 See Gary, supra note 71, at 651-53. 
73 Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepfami/ies in the Law of Intestate Succession and Wills, 22 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 917, 920 (1989). 
74 Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 776 ( 1977); Lewis, supra note 58, at 18. 
75 Nolan, supra note 65, at 1095; see also Mika & Hurst, supra note 69, at 1017; Star, supra note 
37, at 627. 
76 Lewis, supra note 58, at 18-28 (discussing various state statutory schemes). 
77 See Khabbaz v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 930 A.2d 1180, 1183-84 (N.H. 2007). 
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II. JUDICIAL APPROACH 
Most state legislatures have not enacted statutes that specifically deal 
with the inheritance rights of posthumously conceived children. 78 As a re-
sult, the courts have been left to resolve the issue on a case-by-case basis. 
Courts have not yet entertained a non-Social Security case directly dealing 
with a posthumously conceived child seeking to inherit from his or her de-
ceased parent utilizing the intestacy system. 79 Nonetheless, the issue of the 
intestate inheritance rights of posthumously conceived children often comes 
up in Social Security cases. 80 Under the Social Security Act, 81 a person can 
only receive survivor's benefits if he or she is a dependent child of a de-
ceased insured wage earner. 82 In order to be classified as a child for Social 
Security purposes, an individual must be legally entitled to inherit under his 
or her state's intestacy system. 83 Therefore, courts resolving Social Security 
claims have established the rules governing the inheritance rights of post-
humously conceived children. 
Three Social Security cases relevant to the discussion at hand are Ko-
lacy, 84 Woodward, 85 and Khabbaz. 86 In all three cases, the courts evaluated 
the issue of the intestacy status of posthumously conceived children. The 
final case examined in this section, In re Martin B., 87 is a non-Social Secu-
rity case that explores the posthumously conceived child's right to inherit 
through his or her father. 88 
78 Harper, supra note 58, at 272. 
79 See In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d 207, 211 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2007) (discussing the only three 
courts which have dealt with the status of posthumously conceived children with regards to inheriting 
from their father via the Social Security Act). 
80 Susan N. Gary, Posthumously Conceived Heirs: Where the Law Stands and What to Do About 
It Now, PROB. & PROP., Mar.-Apr. 2005, at 32, 32. 
81 Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7 (2000); 20 C.F.R. § 404.355 (2008) (discussing under what 
conditions a child is eligible for Social Security benefits). 
82 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.355 (2008); Kristine S. Knaplund, Equal Protection, Postmortem Concep-
tion, and Intestacy, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 627, 631-32 (2005). 
83 See Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 598-99 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that posthu-
mously conceived twins were eligible for Social Security child's insurance benefits because they met the 
requirements to inherit under Arizona's intestacy system); see also John Doroghazi, Gillett-Netting v. 
Barnhart and Unanswered Questions About Social Security Benefits for Posthumously Conceived Chil-
dren, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1597, 1600 (2005) (proposing that the Social Security Act be amended to 
permit posthumously conceived children to be eligible for benefits); Stephen v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 
386 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1265 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (holding that since the posthumously conceived child did 
not satisfy the requirements necessary to inherit under the Florida intestacy statute, the child was not 
entitled to child survivor benefits). 
84 In re Estate ofKolacy, 753 A.2d 1257 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000). 
85 Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002). 
86 Khabbaz v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 930 A.2d 1180 (N.H. 2007). 
8? 841 N.Y.S.2d 207 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2007). 
88 Id. at210. 
2009] RESPONDING TO THE EXISTENCE OF AFTERDEA TH CHILDREN 413 
When adjudicating these cases, courts have considered the multiple 
competing interests of the state, the posthumously conceived child, the oth-
er living heirs involved, and the deceased that are at play when addressing 
the issue of whether a posthumously conceived child should be allowed to 
inherit from his or her father's estate. States have an interest in the quick 
and final administration of probate estates. That interest would be under-
mined if probate courts left the estate opened indefinitely in anticipation of 
the births of posthumously conceived children. 89 In contrast, posthumously 
conceived children have an interest in the estate being kept open to give 
them the opportunity to be born, so they can inherit from their parents. Be-
cause children have a right to the financial support of their parents, it seems 
equitable that they be permitted to inherit. 9° Courts have also taken the in-
terest of other living heirs into consideration.91 In cases where a deceased 
father has other living heirs inheriting from his estate, the living heirs have 
an interest in receiving their inheritances in a prompt manner and in reduc-
ing the number of heirs who could claim against the estate. 92 All of these 
interests must be considered when states are drafting appropriate legislation 
concerning posthumously conceived children. The cases discussed below 
depict how some courts have grappled with trying to use an inadequate state 
statute to address this complex and emotional issue. 
A. Estate ofKolacy 
Estate of Kolacy arose in New Jersey and was thus governed by the 
New Jersey statutes on intestacy. 93 The court took the opportunity to adju-
dicate the posthumously conceived children's status as their fathers' heirs. 94 
On February 7, 1994, doctors informed William Kolacy that he had leuke-
mia. As a consequence, he needed to receive chemotherapy treatments. 
William worried that, as a result of his chemotherapy treatments, he might 
be unable to contribute to the creation of children. 95 Thus, in accordance 
with William's wishes, prior to undergoing chemotherapy and during the 
89 Id. at 203-04 (counteracting this problem, the court suggests, in dicta, that the legislature could 
use time limits to restrict the inheritance rights of posthumously conceived children). 
90 In re Estate ofKolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1262 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000). 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. Specifically, the case involved an evaluation of New Jersey's afterbom heirs' then-current 
statute, which stated, "Relatives of the decedent conceived before his death but born thereafter inherit as 
if they had been born in the lifetime of the decedent." See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 38:5-8 (amended West 
2004) (2008). 
94 Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1260. 
95 Id. at 1258. 
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treatment, the doctor harvested William's sperm to be placed in a sperm 
bank:. 96 Unfortunately, William succumbed to cancer on April 15, 1995.97 
More than eighteen months after William's death, his wife, Marianto-
nia Kolacy, gave birth to twin girls as a result of IVF. 98 In order to receive 
financial assistance to help care for her children, Mariantonia applied for 
Social Security dependent benefits. 99 The Social Security Administration 
("SSA") denied Mariantonia's application because the panel determined 
that the twins were not legally William's children, despite the fact that the 
twins were William's genetic and biological children. 100 An Administrative 
Law Judge ("ALJ") issued a written decision upholding the denial of bene-
fits. IOI 
Instead of appealing the ALJ's decision, Mariantonia filed an action in 
the Superior Court of New Jersey to have her twins declared William's le-
gal heirs, making them eligible for Social Security child's insurance bene-
fits.102 Thus, Mariantonia planned to use the state court's declaration of 
heirship to help her win her Social Security appeal. 103 
In order to resolve the case, the Superior Court of New Jersey had to 
decide whether posthumously conceived children qualified as heirs under 
New Jersey's intestacy system. 104 The court approached the issue by explor-
ing why the legislature created an intestacy system that gives preference to 
children. 105 In light of that exploration, the court determined that the general 
legislative intent when enacting statutory provisions dealing with intestate 
succession, including the afterbom heirs statute, was to give children the 
opportunity to inherit from and through their parents. 106 That determination 
led the court to conclude that the intestacy statutes should be read broadly 
enough to give a decedent's posthumously conceived child the chance to 
inherit from his estate. 107 
The court also considered the competing interests involved when post-
humously conceived children seek to inherit from their parents. After con-
sidering all of the aforementioned competing interests, the court held that 




99 Id. at 1259. 
100 Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1259. 
101 Id 
102 Id. ("Section 216 of the Social Security Act provides ... that [a] '[c]hild's insurance benefits 
can be paid to a child who could inherit under the State's interstate laws."'). 
103 Id. at 1260. 
l04 Id. at 1262. 
lOS Id. at 1261-62. 
106 Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1261-62. 
l o7 Id. at 1263-64. 
108 Id. 
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heirs who would be disadvantaged by allowing the posthumously conceived 
twins to inherit from his estate. 109 When balancing the competing interests, 
the court was persuaded by the fact that the evidence indicated William 
wanted the children to be conceived posthumously. 110 Therefore, he proba-
bly wanted them to have all of the legal protections that would come with 
being his children. 111 
The outcome of this case is in line with most public policy arguments 
on the issue of posthumously conceived children. Although the court bal-
anced the three important competing interests of the state, the posthumously 
conceived child, and the living heirs, it appeared to give the interest of 
posthumously conceived children priority. Once posthumously conceived 
children are born, they need to be financially supported by their parents. If 
the father were alive, he would be required to pay child support to finance 
the child's needs. 112 After the father's death, the father's Social Security 
benefits should be used to take care of his children. 113 In light of the fact 
that William had no other living children, the court's approach was equita-
ble. Under the current Social Security system, if a man dies without survi-
vors, all of the money that he has paid into the system disappears. The man 
does not have the right to dispose of the money by will. Further, none of the 
money becomes part of the man's intestate estate. 114 The end result is that 
the man's money escheats to the federal government. In a case where there 
are children who are genetically related to the deceased man, it would be 
unfair for the government to benefit at the expense of those children. In 
Kolacy, if the court had not allowed the posthumously conceived children 
to receive William's Social Security benefits, all of the money that he paid 
into the system would have remained with the government. Therefore, Wil-
liam's children might have been forced to rely on public assistance. This is 
clearly not the outcome William would have wanted. 
In addition to considering the multiple competing interests at stake in 
these cases, there are also sound public policy arguments. For example, 
because William did not live long enough to recoup the money he paid into 
109 Id. at I 263-64. 
I IO Id. at 1263. 
Ill Id 
112 Gloria J. Banks, Traditional Concepts and Nontraditional Conceptions: Social Security Survi-
vor's Benefits for Posthumously Conceived Children, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 251, 299 (1999); see also 
Ann-Patton Nelson, Casenote, A New Era of Dead-Beat Dads: Determining Social Security Survivor 
Benefits for Children Who Are Posthumously Conceived, 56 MERCER L. REV. 759, 763 (2005). 
113 Nelson, supra note I 12, at 763. 
114 See Richard W. Pingel, Note, Should Social Security Retire? A Study of Personal Retirement 
Accounts in the American Probate System, 20 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 99, I I I (2006) ("For example, a 
64-year-old man may have worked every day since he was I 6, paying tens of thousands of dollars of 
taxes into Social Security. At his death, the retirement benefit into which he has been paying throughout 
his life is lost unless his family structure fits within the limited qualifications required for survivor 
benefits. If the man dies unmarried and without minor children his retirement benefits are lost."). 
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the Social Security system, from a public policy perspective it seems equi-
table that the court allowed his children to receive the money instead. 
Moreover, another public policy argument supporting the outcome of this 
case is that receiving their father's benefits prevented the children from 
being forced to depend upon public assistance. 115 
B. Woodward116 
The decision in Woodward is consistent with the outcome of Kolacy 
and involves a similar set of facts. Woodward, however, occurred in Massa-
chusetts, and therefore was governed by the Massachusetts state intestacy 
statutes. 117 In January 1993, Warren Woodward was diagnosed with leuke-
mia and scheduled to undergo treatment. 118 Because Warren and his wife, 
Lauren, did not have any children, they were concerned that Warren might 
be rendered sterile as a result of the treatment. 119 Consequently, the Wood-
wards had some of Warren's sperm extracted and placed in a sperm bank. 120 
In October 1993, Warren died after an unsuccessful bone marrow 
transplant. 121 Two years later, Lauren gave birth to twin girls who were 
conceived through artificial insemination using Warren's sperm. 122 Lauren 
submitted an application for Social Security survivor's benefits on behalf of 
herself and the children. 123 Lauren relied on Section 402(g)( 1) of the Social 
Security Act to claim mother's benefits based upon her status as a widow 
with dependent children. 124 Lauren's application for benefits for the twins 
was based on their status as children of a person who had died fully insured 
under the Social Security Act. 125 In order to receive mother's benefits, Lau-
I l5 Vegter, supra note 71, at 293. 
116 Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002). For a thorough discussion of 
the Woodward case, see Ronald Chester, Inheritance Rights of The Posthumously Conceived Child: 
What Exactly Does Lauren Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security Decide?, 87 MAss. L. REV. 
49 (2002). 
117 Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 263 n.11 (citing MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 190, §§ 2 (personal property), 
3 (real property) (2008)). 





123 Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 260. 
124 Id. at 260 n.3 ("Section 402(g)(l) ... provides 'mother's' benefits to the widow of an individ-
ual who died fully insured under the Act if, inter alia, she has care of a child or children entitled to 
child's benefits."). 
125 Id. ("Section 402(d)(I) ... provides 'child's' benefits to dependent children of deceased parents 
who die fully insured under the Act."). 
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ren had to convince the SSA that the children were entitled to survivor's 
benefits. 126 
At the initial stage, the SSA denied Lauren's application after deter-
mining the twins were not Warren's children within the meaning of the 
Social Security Act. 127 While she was appealing the SSA's decision, Lauren 
petitioned the Massachusetts Probate and Family Court for an order requir-
ing the clerk of the city to add Warren's name to the twins' birth certifi-
cate.128 As a result, the Probate and Family Court adjudicated Warren as the 
twins' father, and issued an order amending their birth certificates to reflect 
that fact. 129 
Lauren submitted the judgment of paternity and the amended birth cer-
tificates to the SSA. 130 Nonetheless, the ALJ concluded that the twins were 
not eligible for benefits because they would not be considered Warren's 
heirs under Massachusetts's intestacy and paternity laws. 131 After an unsuc-
cessful appeal to the Appeals Council of the SSA, Lauren filed an appeal in 
the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. 132 
The federal court certified the issue to the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts, which had to determine whether posthumously conceived 
children had a right to inherit under the Massachusetts intestacy system. 133 
The parties took dramatically different positions. 134 Lauren argued that 
posthumously conceived children should always have the right to inherit 
from their deceased parent as long as there is proof of a genetic connection 
with the decedent. 135 The government claimed that posthumously conceived 
children should never have the right to inherit from their deceased parent 
because they would not be in existence as of the date of the parent's 
death. 136 The court rejected the positions of both parties as too extreme and 
searched for a middle ground. 137 
In order to resolve the case, the court reviewed Massachusetts's intes-
tacy law. Because, under that law, only a decedent's "issue" had a right to 
inherit the decedent's property, the court had to determine whether the 
twins were Warren's issue. 138 The Massachusetts's legislature did not clear-
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 260. 
128 Id. 
129 Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 260. 




134 Id. at 262. 
135 Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 262. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 263. 
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ly define the term "issue." 139 Thus, the court looked at the legislative pur-
pose behind the Massachusetts's intestacy statute to decide if posthumously 
conceived children should be classified as "issue" for inheritance pur-
poses. 140 
As a part of its analysis, the court discussed three competing state in-
terests that need to be considered when addressing the issue of inheritance 
rights for posthumously conceived children: (1) the state's interest in pro-
moting the best interest of the children, including both posthumously con-
ceived children and children who were alive or conceived prior to the death 
of the parent; (2) the state's interest in preventing fraud and insuring the 
orderly administration of probate estates; and (3) the state's interest in pro-
tecting the reproductive rights of both genetic parents, including the de-
ceased parent. 141 
The Massachusetts court acknowledged that children have the right to 
receive financial support from their parents and to petition their parents' 
estate for support. 142 The court determined that the opportunity to inherit 
should be extended to posthumously conceived children because, in enact-
ing intestacy statutes that gave preference to children, the Massachusetts 
legislature intended to promote the welfare of all children. 143 The court also 
emphasized two key points: (!)·although the legislature knew that posthu-
mously conceived children existed, it took no action to prevent them from 
taking under the intestacy system; 144 and (2) the Massachusetts legislature 
supported the assisted reproductive technologies that were the only means 
by which posthumously conceived children could come into being. 145 Thus, 
once they were born, the Massachusetts legislature was obligated to give 
them the same rights as other children. 146 
The court next addressed Massachusetts's interest in the prompt and 
accurate administration of probate estates. 147 Like the court in Kolacy, the 
139 Id. See also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 265 ( 1940) ("[T]he word 'issue,' when used 
in the phrases 'die without issue,' or 'failure of issue' or in some other phrase of similar import, denotes 
all lineal descendants from the designated ancestor who are within the line of inheritance from such 
ancestor."). Examples of typical intestacy statutes defining issue are the following: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
12, § IOI (2008) ("Issue of a person means all of the person's lineal descendants of all generations, 
with the relationship of parent and child at each generation being determined by the definitions of child 
and parent contained in this title."); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS§ 1-209(a) (LexisNexis 2008) ("In 
construing all provisions of the estates of decedent law and, unless a contrary intention is indicated, in 
construing the terms of a will, issue means every living lineal descendant except a lineal descendant of a 
living lineal descendant."). 
140 Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 264. 
141 Id. at 264-65. 
142 Id. at 264. 
143 Id. at 265-66. 
144 Id. at 265. 
145 Id. 
146 Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 265-66. 
147 Id. at 266. 
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Woodward court felt that the state was obligated to provide certainty to the 
decedent's heirs and creditors. 148 Although the court reserved judgment on 
the resolution of the time constraints in question, the court noted that be-
cause posthumously conceived children could be born years after the death 
of their parent, permitting them to inherit would make it difficult for the 
state to achieve its administrative goals. 149 Therefore, instead of focusing on 
the need for finality, the court next dealt with the state's interest in prevent-
ing fraud on the probate courts. The court concluded that the probability of 
fraud would be diminished by the fact that the posthumously conceived 
children, like other non-marital children, 150 were required to prove paternity 
before they could inherit. 151 
Lastly, the court discussed the state's interest in honoring the right of 
persons to choose if and when to reproduce. 152 The court decided that the 
person claiming rights on behalf of the posthumously conceived child had 
to present convincing evidence that the deceased person consented to the 
posthumous conception and agreed to support the child that resulted from 
the procedure. 153 This requirement would protect the reproductive rights of 
the deceased and further the state's goal of fraud prevention. 154 
After balancing the competing state interests of promoting the best in-
terests of the children, preventing fraud and insuring the orderly administra-
tion of probate estates, and protecting the reproductive rights of both ge-
netic parents, the court held that it was in the best interests of posthumously 
conceived children to be given the opportunity to inherit from their de-
ceased parents. 155 However, the court recognized that some precautions 
were necessary to protect the integrity of the probate system and the repro-
ductive rights of the deceased parent. 156 Therefore, the Woodward court 
established a three-part test that must be satisfied before the posthumously 
conceived child can inherit from his or her deceased parent: 157 (1) the per-
son representing the posthumously conceived child must provide evidence 
that the child and the decedent were genetically related; (2) the representa-
tive must prove that the decedent affirmatively agreed to the child's post-
humous conception; and (3) the representative must show that the decedent 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 268. 
150 Marriage ends at death, so children conceived after the death of one of the parties are non-
marital. Scharman, supra note 50, at 1020 n.154 (citing Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 266-67). 
151 Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 267. 
152 Id. at 268. 
153 Id. at 269. 
154 Id. at 269-70. 
155 Id. at 266. 
156 Id. at 272. 
157 Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 270. 
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affirmatively consented to provide financial support to any child conceived 
as a result of the posthumous process. 158 
The three-part test created by the Woodward court serves as a good 
model for state legislatures seeking to protect the interests of the posthu-
mously conceived child, the pre-existing heirs, the decedent, and the 
state. 159 The posthumously conceived child will benefit from the court's 
decision by having the opportunity to inherit from his or her father. 
C. Khabbaz 160 
Despite the holding by the court in Woodward, the posthumously con-
ceived child's right to inherit from his or her father is not always recog-
nized. One of the most recent courts to consider the inheritance rights of a 
posthumously conceived child was the Supreme Court of New Hampshire. 
The court had to decide whether a child conceived after her father's death 
via artificial insemination was eligible to inherit from her father as his sur-
viving issue under New Hampshire intestacy law. 161 
In September 1989, Donna M. Eng and Rurnzi Brian Khabbaz got 
married. 162 Unfortunately, in April 1997, doctors informed the couple that 
Khabbaz had a life-threatening illness. 163 Although the couple already had 
one child, Khabbaz banked his sperm and executed a consent form author-
izing Eng to use the sperm to conceive his child. 164 Khabbaz also indicated 
that he wanted to be acknowledged as the legal father if Eng conceived a 
child through artificial insemination using his sperm. 165 On May 23, 1998, 
Khabbaz died. 166 Eng gave birth to a child, Christine, using Khabbaz's 
sperm in the summer of 2000. 167 
Eng tried unsuccessfully to get Social Security survivor's benefits for 
Christine. 168 The SSA Commissioner denied benefits based upon a determi-
nation that Christine would not be eligible to inherit from Khabbaz under 
158 Id. 
159 See Susan C. Stevenson-Popp, Comment, "I Have Loved You In My Dreams": Posthumous 
Reproduction and the Need for Change in the Uniform Parentage Act, 52 CATH. U. L. REV. 727, 758 
(2003) (advocating modifying statutory law to line up with the reasoning of the Woodward decision). 
160 Khabbaz v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 930 A.2d 1180 (N.H. 2007). 





166 Khabbaz, 930 A.2d at 1182. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. 
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New Hampshire's intestacy distribution law. 169 The ALJ and the SSA Ap-
peals Council upheld the Commissioner's decision. 170 
In response, Christine appealed the Commissioner's decision to the 
United States District Court. 171 First, Eng argued that Christine should be 
classified as a "surviving issue" based on the language of the intestacy stat-
ute. 172 The court rejected that argument, relying on its interpretation of the 
meaning of "surviving."173 Relying upon Webster's Dictionary, the court 
concluded that, in order to be considered a survivor, Christine had to be 
alive or in existence when her father died. 174 The court reasoned that, be-
cause Christine was not conceived until after her father's death, she could 
not be legally recognized as his survivor. 175 The court went so far as to de-
clare that no "posthumously conceived child is a 'surviving issue' within 
the plain meaning of the [New Hampshire] statute." 176 
In the alternative, Eng argued that Christine was a non-marital child 
because, at the time of Christine's conception, Eng was no longer married 
to Khabbaz. 177 Eng wanted Christine to be treated as a child born out-of-
wedlock so she could avail herself of the process the legislature had estab-
lished for non-marital children to have the opportunity to inherit from their 
fathers. 178 The court found Eng's argument to be without merit for two rea-
sons. First, the court opined that the legislature intended the statute to deal 
with children whose parents were not married prior to their births. 179 Be-
cause they were a married couple, Eng and Khabbaz were therefore not 
among the class of persons intended to be covered by the statute. 180 Second, 
the court concluded that Christine could not be categorized as an illegiti-
169 Id. See also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 561 :I (2006) [hereinafter "RSA"). 
l70 Khabbaz, 930 A.2d at 1182. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. at 1183. New Hampshire's intestacy distribution law provides in part: "The part of the 
intestate estate not passing to the surviving spouse under paragraph I, or the entire intestate estate if 
there is no surviving spouse, passes as follows: (a) To the issue of the decedent equally if they are all of 
the same degree of kinship to the decedent, but if of unequal degree, then those of more remote degree 
take by representation." RSA§ 561: 1 (II) (2002). 
173 Khabbaz, 930 A.2d at 1183-84 ("[T]he plain meaning of the word 'surviving' is 'remaining 
alive or in existence."' (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2303 (un-
abridged ed. 2002))). 
174 Id. at 1184. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 1185. 
178 Id. See RSA § 561 :4(1l) (2006) ("A child born of unwed parents shall inherit from or through 
his father as if born in lawful wedlock, under any of the following conditions: (a) Intermarriage of the 
parents after the birth of the child. (b) Acknowledgement ofpatemity or legitimation by the father. (c) A 
court decree adjudges the decedent to be the father before his death. (d) Paternity is established after the 
death of the father by clear and convincing evidence. (e) The decedent had adopted the child."). 
l79 Khabbaz, 930 A.2d at 1185. 
180 Id. 
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mate child because, under New Hampshire's statutory scheme, children 
conceived by the artificial insemination of a married woman are considered 
legitimate. 181 
Eng's final argument was based upon public policy. She asserted that a 
posthumously conceived child who was conceived within a reasonable time 
after his or her father's death should be permitted to inherit from the fa-
ther's estate. 182 In putting forth this argument, Eng urged the court to adopt 
the rationale of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Woodward. 183 
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire sympathized with Eng, but stated 
that setting public policy was the job of the state legislature and not the 
court. 184 Consequently, based upon the language of the New Hampshire 
statute as established by the New Hampshire legislature, the court was 
compelled to "leave[] an entire class of posthumous[ly conceived] children 
unprotected." 185 
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire's strict interpretation of the 
New Hampshire statute in Khabbaz was detrimental to the posthumously 
conceived child and possibly inconsistent with the deceased's wishes. Al-
though the court felt it was the state legislature's role to make public policy, 
the court's hyper-technical approach was contrary to the goal of the intes-
tacy system because it defeated the intent of the decedent. 186 The steps 
Khabbaz took prior to his death indicated that he wanted to be legally re-
sponsible for any child conceived using his stored sperm. 187 In light of these 
facts, and in order to ensure that Khabbaz's estate was distributed in a man-
ner consistent with his wishes, the court should have interpreted the intes-
tacy statute broadly enough to give the posthumously conceived child the 
opportunity to inherit from her father. 
In this case, Khabbaz had a biological child prior to the birth of Chris-
tine, the posthumously conceived child. 188 Khabbaz's living heir would not 
be disadvantaged by permitting the child posthumously conceived to inherit 
from Khabbaz after his death. Nothing in the facts indicated that Khabbaz 
would not want his children to inherit on an equal basis. 189 Both children 
were conceived using Khabbaz's sperm; the only difference between the 
living heir and the posthumously conceived child was the timing of their 
conception. In essence, the court penalized Christine because of the circum-
l8l Id. (citing RSA§ 168-8:7 (2002)). 
182 Id. at 1186. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Khabbaz, 930 A.2d at 1186 (quoting id. at 1188 (Broderick, C.J., concurring specially)) (altera-
tion in original) (internal quotations omitted). 
186 See id. at 1182 (indicating that it was Khabbaz's "desire and intent to be legally recognized as 
the father of the child to the fullest extent allowable by law" (internal quotations omitted)). 
187 Id. 
188 Id. 
189 See id. 
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stances of her birth. The Supreme Court has renounced that approach with 
regard to non-marital children. 190 This differential treatment should be con-
sidered to be against public policy. Over the years, legislatures and courts 
have sought to ensure that all classes of children are treated similarly with 
regards to inheriting under the intestacy system. 191 Moreover, since Khab-
baz consented in writing to the use of his sperm to conceive a child, his 
reproductive rights are protected and there is limited opportunity for 
fraud. 192 Additionally, it could be argued that not recognizing Khabbaz as 
the legal father of the posthumously conceived child intrudes upon Khab-
baz' s right to procreate in the manner in which he desires. 193 
D. In re Martin B. 194 
In re Martin B., one of the few cases to directly address the inheri-
tance rights of posthumously conceived children, dealt with the children's 
ability to inherit through their deceased father. 195 The case involved seven 
trust instruments (six were governed by the law of the District of Columbia 
and one was governed by the law of New York). 196 On December 31, 1969, 
Martin B. (identified in the case as the Grantor) executed seven trust 
agreements. 197 Under the terms of the trusts, Martin B. was entitled to re-
ceive income from the trust during his lifetime. 198 The trustees of the trust 
were instructed to retain the principal while Martin B. was alive. After Mar-
tin B. 's death, but before the death of his wife, Abigail, the trustees had the 
discretion to dispense the principal to and among his issue. 199 The trustees 
were authorized to distribute the principal after Abigail's death. The distri-
bution was to be to Martin B. 's issue or descendants in accordance with 
Abigail's directions. 200 If Abigail failed to exercise her right to control the 
division of the trust principal, the trustee was instructed to distribute the 
principal to or for the benefit of the issue surviving at the time of Abigail's 
death. 201 This case dealt with the status of Martin B. 's posthumously con-
ceived grandchildren with regards to the trust. 202 
190 See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769-70 (1977). 
19I See Vegter, supra note 71, at 273-82. 
192 Khabbaz v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 930 A.2d 1180, 1182 (N.H. 2007). 
I 93 Id.; see Gibbons, supra note 55, at 201-02. 
194 841N.Y.S.2d207 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2007). 
195 Id. at 208. 
196 Id at 207-08. 
197 Id at 207. 
198 Id. at 208. 
199 Id. 
200 Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d at 208. 
201 Id 
202 Id. 
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In July 2001, Martin B. died. 203 His wife, Abigail, their son Lindsay, 
and Lindsay's two adult children survived Martin B. 204 Martin B.'s other 
son, James, died in January 2001. 205 James's two young sons, conceived by 
IVF using James's frozen semen, also survived Martin B. 206 
It was clear that "issue" included Lindsay and his two adult children. 207 
The dispute arose because of the existence of James's sons. Prior to his 
death, James deposited a sample of his semen at a laboratory to be frozen. 208 
He instructed the laboratory that, in the event of his death, his wife Nancy 
had the authority to make decisions with regard to the use of the semen. 209 
After James died, Nancy used his semen to have one son in 2004 and an-
other son in 2006. 2w The trustees went to court to find out if James' s post-
humously conceived sons were included in the class of trust beneficiaries. 211 
The court, therefore, had to decide whether the posthumously conceived 
children were descendants and issue for purposes of the trust. 212 
In order to determine if the posthumously conceived children had the 
right to inherit the trust principal through their father, the court reviewed 
the intestacy statutes of New York and the District of Columbia. 213 Neither 
jurisdiction had a statute specifically dealing with the rights of posthu-
mously conceived children. 214 As a result, the court asserted that, in order to 
resolve the case, it had to rely upon "statutes in other jurisdictions, model 
codes, scholarly discussions and Restatements of the law."215 
After that review, the court in Martin-much like the courts in Kolacy, 
Woodward, and Khabbaz-concluded that other state legislatures and 
courts that had addressed the issue of the inheritance rights of posthu-
mously conceived children had to balance the competing interests of: 
(1) the public's desire to have a probate system that is efficient, final, and 
accurate; (2) the state's need to respect the reproductive rights of its citi-
zens; and (3) the rights of the children born as a consequence of artificial 
insemination. 216 The court asserted that it is in the best interests of those 




206 Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d at 208. 
207 Id 
208 Id 
209 Id. at 207-08. 
210 Id. 
211 Id. 
212 Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d at 207-08. 
213 Id. at 208. 
214 Id. at 209. 
215 Id. 
216 Id. at 211. 
217 Id. 
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After analyzing the various statutes and judicial decisions, the Martin 
court opined that other legislatures and courts had recommended two key 
mechanisms to promote the interest of all the parties: (1) most state intes-
tacy statutes mandated that the man give written permission to have his 
genetic material used to create a child after his death; and (2) most ~tate 
laws required that the child be created within a certain time period follow-
ing the man's passing. 218 Bearing these two factors in mind, the Martin 
court held that the posthumously conceived children were eligible to inherit 
through their father because Martin B. 's intent was for all members of his 
bloodline to get a share of the trust funds. 219 
The court relied upon several factors to justify its holding. First, James 
satisfied the written consent requirement by leaving instructions with the 
laboratory telling them that his wife, Nancy, had the right to decide what to 
do with his semen. 220 Because James gave Nancy such broad discretion, it 
was not unreasonable to conclude that he would not object to Nancy using 
the semen to conceive his child. 221 Second, the court noted that, after con-
ceiving her two sons, Nancy permitted the rest of James's sperm to be de-
stroyed. 222 Therefore, at the time of the hearing, the class of James' s chil-
dren was closed, and his estate could be closed with certainty. 223 
Finally, the court reviewed the trust instruments and found them silent 
in regard to the status of posthumously conceived children. 224 The court 
decided the failure to mention posthumously conceived children indicated, 
at the time the trust instruments were drafted, that the Grantor could not 
have contemplated children could be conceived after the death of their fa-
thers. 225 As a result, the court decided to give the posthumously conceived 
children the benefit of the doubt and concluded their grandfather would 
want them to be treated the same as his other grandchildren. 226 The court's 
conclusion was supported by the fact that, in the trust instruments, the 
Grantor provided that, after Abigail died, the trust funds were to benefit the 
Grantor's sons and their families equally. 227 
The medical community will continue to develop technology to give 
persons more creative ways to produce children. 228 Because intestacy laws 
2l8 MartinB.,841 N.Y.S.2dat211. 
219 Id. 




224 Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d at 211. 
225 Id. at 212. 
226 Id. 
227 Id. 
228 The Khabbaz court stated "reproductive technologies will grow and advance, and as they do, 
the number of children they will produce will continue to multiply. So, too, will the complex moral, 
legal, social, and ethical questions that surround their birth." Khabbaz v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 
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are governed by state statutes, and because states have failed to adopt ade-
quate statutes to address this issue, courts will continue to be forced to deal 
with the legal issues faced by children who are conceived in non-traditional 
ways. 229 More than one court has urged the legislature to take affirmative 
action to address the issues relevant to children created as the result of re-
productive technology. 230 In fact, the entire concurring opinion in the Khab-
baz case is a plea to the New Hampshire legislature to adopt an intestacy 
statutory scheme that addresses the needs of children created using new 
birth technologies. 231 As the next Part indicates, that guidance has been 
slow in coming. 
Ill. LEGISLATIVE APPROACH 
The state legislatures that have developed laws governing the rights of 
posthumously conceived children have enacted statutes that attempt to ad-
dress the issues raised in the court cases discussed above. Some variations 
exist, however, among these statutes. Approximately eleven states have 
statutes specifically dealing with the inheritance rights of posthumously 
conceived children.232 Six of those states have followed the approach rec-
ommended by the UPA233 and five states have taken an independent ap-
proach. 234 One statute, enacted in Ohio, specifically prohibits a posthu-
mously conceived child from inheriting from his or her father. 235 That ap-
proach was also endorsed by the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted 
930 A.2d 1180, 1186 (N.H. 2007) (quoting Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 272 
(Mass. 2002)). 
229 See id. at 1187 (Broderick, C.J., concurring specially). 
230 E.g., In re Estate ofKolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1261 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000) ("It would 
undoubtedly be useful for the Legislature to deal consciously and in a well informed way with at least 
some of the issues presented by reproductive technology."); Khabbaz, 930 A.2d at 1186 ("The questions 
present in this case cry out for lengthy, careful examination outside the adversary process, which can 
only address the specific circumstances of each controversy that presents itself. They demand a compre-
hensive response reflecting the considered will of the people." (quoting Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 272 
(internal quotations omitted))). 
23l Khabbaz, 930 A.2d at 1187-89. 
232 WYO. STAT. ANN. 1977 § 14-2-907 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE§ 26.26.730 (2008); TEX. FAM. 
CODE ANN. § 160.707 (Vernon 2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-707 (2008); CAL. PROB. CODE 
§ 249.5 (West 2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.14 (LexisNexis 2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 9:391.1 (2008); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 14-20-65 (707) (2008); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78-45g-707 (2008); 
VA. CODE ANN.§ 20-158 (West 2008); FLA. STAT.§ 742.17(4) (West 2008). 
233 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707 (2008). Those states are Delaware, North Dakota, Texas, Utah, 
Washington, and Wyoming. See supra note 232. 
234 Those states are California, Florida, Louisiana, Ohio, and Virginia. See supra note 232. 
235 OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 2105.14 (LexisNexis 2008) ("Descendants of an intestate begotten 
before his death, but born thereafter, in all cases will inherit as if born in the lifetime of the intestate and 
surviving him; but in no other case can a person inherit unless living at the time of the death of the 
intestate."). 
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Conception Act ("USCACA"). 236 Louisiana is unique in that it gives the 
existing heirs standing to contest the posthumously conceived child's right 
to inherit. 237 
Despite these variances, eight of the eleven state statutes outlining the 
legal rights of posthumously conceived children contain requirements of: 
(1) the decedent's consent to produce children with his gametes; (2) written 
proof of the decedent's consent; (3) time restrictions on the conception or 
birth of posthumously conceived children seeking to inherit from their fa-
thers; and ( 4) marriage between a man and a woman before the woman is 
able to use the man's sperm to conceive a child after the man has died. 238 
The majority of the statutes specifying the conditions under which the post-
humously conceived child can inherit are exclusively applicable to married 
couples and often do not apply to children born out of wedlock or children 
of same sex couples. 239 
A Consent 
In order for the posthumously conceived child to have the opportunity 
to inherit from his father, most states require at least a minimum level of 
consent from the man. For example, under the California, Louisiana, and 
Virginia statutes, the decedent will be legally recognized as the father of the 
posthumously conceived child if, prior to his death, he consented to the 
artificial insemination of his wife. 240 This approach is consistent with the 
statutes that deal with children who are conceived through artificial insemi-
nation during the life of the woman's husband. If the woman's husband 
consents to the artificial insemination of his wife, he is considered the legal 
father of the child even if the child was conceived using another man's ge-
netic material. 241 Hence, it is reasonable to recognize a consenting spouse as 
the father of a child created using his genetic material after he dies. This 
supports the public policy argument that similarly situated children should 
be treated in the same manner. 
Texas and the other states that have adopted the UP A go a step further. 
In those jurisdictions, in addition to consenting to the use of his genetic 
236 Stevenson-Popp, supra note 159, at 734 ("An individual who dies before implantation of an 
embryo, or before a child is conceived other than through sexual intercourse, using the individual's egg 
or sperm, is not a parent of the resulting child." (citing UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED 
CONCEPTION ACT 1988 § 4(b))). In 2000, the language of this act was integrated into the Uniform 
Parentage Act. Id. 
237 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 190 (2008). 
238 See supra note 232. 
239 Id. 
240 LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 9:391.1 (2008); CAL. PROB. CODE§ 249.5(a) (West 2008); VA. CODE 
ANN.§ 20-158(8) (West 2008). 
241 Mika & Hurst, supra note 69, at 1015. 
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materials, the man must agree to be treated as the parent of the child that is 
conceived after his death. 242 According to the Utah statute, a man must con-
sent to the artificial insemination and to the establishment of the parent-
child relationship. 243 These statutes place an additional burden on the moth-
er of the posthumously conceived child, mandating that she prove that the 
man agreed to the child's conception and to the recognition of his paternity. 
This requirement, however, appears to be unnecessary. If, while he is alive, 
a man agrees to have his wife conceive a child using his sperm or the sperm 
of a donor, most states will consider him to be legally responsible for the 
child. 244 Courts do not permit husbands, who consent to have a child artifi-
cially created, to waive their parental rights and obligations. 245 Hence, if a 
man consents to the use of his genetic material after his death, it should be 
presumed that he is also consenting to be legally recognized as a parent of 
the resulting child. 
Florida's statute does not contain a consent requirement. 246 However, 
because the statute mandates the execution of a will, an additional consent 
requirement is not necessary. 247 In Florida, the man's consent to the concep-
tion of the child may be implied by the provision for the child in his will. 248 
The Restatement of Property does not specifically require a man to 
consent to the conception in order for the posthumously conceived child to 
have the right to inherit. 249 Nonetheless, the Restatement does provide that 
the child has to be born in circumstances indicating that the deceased man 
would have approved of the child's right to inherit. 250 That statement im-
plies that some type of indicia of consent must exist. The consent require-
ment is usually accompanied by the mandate for some type of writing. 
B. The Writing Requirement 
In addition to consent, some state statutes require the actual written 
consent of the father before a court can award inheritance rights to a post-
humously conceived child. With regard to the writing requirement, state 
legislatures have taken two approaches. The majority of states have kept the 
language of their statutes general, giving the courts in those jurisdictions 
more flexibility in determining what qualifies as appropriate written con-
242 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.§ 160.707 (Vernon 2008). 
243 UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-45g-707, 78-45g-201 (2008) (discussing the ways to establish the 
father-child relationship). 
244 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN.§ 9-10-201 (2008). 
245 See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.§ 160.705. 
246 FLA. STAT.§ 742.l 7(4)(West 2008). 
247 Id. 
248 Id. 
249 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY§ 251 (1999). 
250 Id.; see also Howard-Potter, supra note 53, at 44. 
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sent. 251 The legislatures in the minority of states have specifically worded 
statutes that contain detailed directions stating the actions that are necessary 
to satisfy the writing requirement. 252 
1. Majority View: Broad Judicial Discretion 
Under the Louisiana statute, the posthumously conceived child can on-
ly inherit if, prior to his death, the biological father specifically gave his 
surviving spouse written permission to use his genetic material to create a 
child. 253 The Louisiana statute does not give clear directions about the re-
quired content or form of writing. The statute only refers to some type of 
written authorization. 254 Virginia's statute also contains a writing require-
ment that is very general. 255 Under the Virginia statute, the required writing 
must be executed prior to the use of the man's sperm. 256 The UPA and the 
states adopting it allow the posthumously conceived child to inherit from 
his or her father if the man consents in a record. 257 However, "record" is 
defined broadly in the UP A and statutes, leaving it unclear what type of 
record would satisfy the writing requirement. 258 
2. Minority View: Little Judicial Discretion 
The California statute gives clear directions. It includes a detailed list 
of the information the writing must contain to satisfy the statute. 259 The 
25! See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 9:391.1 (2008). 
252 See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE§ 249.5(a) (West 2008); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.§ 160.705 (Vernon 
2008) (stating that the written record must be held by a licensed physician). 
253 LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 9:391.1. 
254 Id. (requiring only specific authorization in writing). 
255 VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(8) (West 2008) (requiring only that a donor of sperm or ovum is not 
a parent unless consenting to serve as a parent in writing). 
256 Id. 
257 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707 (2008), 98 U.L.A. 358-59 (2008) ("If an individual who 
consented in a record to be a parent by assisted reproduction dies before placement of eggs, sperm, or 
embryos, the deceased individual is not a parent of the resulting child unless the deceased spouse con-
sented in a record that if assisted reproduction were to occur after death, the deceased individual would 
be a parent of the child."). See also, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN.§ 788-15-707 (2008) (substituting the term 
"spouse" for the term "individual"). 
258 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 102(18), 98 U.L.A. 303, 305 (defining record as "information 
that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retriev-
able in perceivable form"); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 788-15-102(18) (same). See also H.R. 1999, 80th Leg. 
(Tex. 2007) (proposing amendments to TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.707 (Vernon 2008) to require that 
the record mandated by the statute be kept by a licensed physician). 
259 Compare CAL. PROB. CODE§§ 249.5(a)(l)-(3) (West 2008) (requiring the decedent to execute 
the writing by signature and date, amend and revoke the writing through subsequent signings and dates, 
and to designate an individual to control his or her genetic material) with UTAH CODE ANN. § 788-15-
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writing required by the California statute resembles a will. 260 The Florida 
legislature also opted for a more stringent and articulated approach, assert-
ing that the posthumously conceived child can only inherit from his or her 
deceased father if the man provided for the child in his will. 261 
C. Time Restrictions 
As some courts have held, permitting a posthumously conceived child 
to inherit from his or her father promotes the best interests of the child. 262 
Nonetheless, keeping the man's estate open to give the child the opportu-
nity to be conceived and born may frustrate the interests of the state and the 
man's other heirs. In order for the probate system to operate efficiently, the 
probate court must close estates within a reasonable period of time. 263 Fur-
thermore, the man's heirs should not have to wait indefinitely to rec.eive 
their inheritance. 264 
To address those concerns, some state legislatures have placed time re-
strictions on the birth of posthumously conceived children seeking eligibil-
ity to inherit from their fathers. 265 For example, in Louisiana, in order to 
inherit, the posthumously conceived child must be born within three years 
of the death of his or her father. 266 Under California's statute, the child has 
to be conceived within two years of his or her father's death. 267 The Re-
statement's approach requires the child to be born within a reasonable time 
after the father's death in circumstances indicating that the decedent would 
707 (requiring a deceased spouse to consent in a record to be a parent of a child created by assisted 
reproduction after the deceased spouse's death), and UTAH CODE ANN. § 788-15-102(18) (defining 
"record" as "information that is inscribed in a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other 
medium and is retrievable in perceivable form"). 
260 Compare CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 249.5(a)(I )-(3) (requiring the decedent donating genetic mate-
rial for posthumous conception to sign and date a writing to execute, amend, and revoke the writing), 
with CAL. PROB. CODE§§ 6110(a)-(b)(3) (West 2008) (requiring a will to be in writing and signed by 
the testator, a designcc of the testator, or a conservator). 
261 FLA. STAT.§ 742.17(4)(Wcst 2008). 
262 See, e.g., Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 265 (Mass. 2002) (recognizing 
that courts must consider the best interests of the children when considering the distribution of inheri-
tance rights). 
263 See, e.g., Fazilat v. Feldstein, 848 A.2d 761, 766 (N.J. 2004) (recognizing that the state has an 
interest in the prompt settlement of estates). 
264 See, e.g., Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 266 (recognizing that posthumously conceived children 
will draw funds away from other heirs, who have a right to the prompt and accurate administration of 
estates). 
265 See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE§ 249.5(c) (West 2008) (providing that the genetic material must be 
used within two years of the decedent's death); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:391(A) (2008) (requiring the 
use of the genetic material within three years of death). 
266 LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 9:391(A). 
267 CAL. PROB. CODE§ 249.5(c). 
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have approved of the child's right to inherit. 268 The Florida and the Virginia 
statutes do not put time constraints on the conception or the birth of the 
posthumously conceived child. 269 Thus, the estates in those jurisdictions 
have the potential to remain open indefinitely while the woman decides to 
use the decedent's sperm to conceive a child. 270 
D. Marital Status 
Most statutes addressing the issue of posthumously conceived children 
are only applicable to married couples. For example, under the Louisiana 
statute, the child must be born to a surviving spouse. 271 Likewise, the Texas 
statute and the statutes of the other states that have adopted the UP A only 
refer to the rights of spouses. 272 Thus, the child's right to inherit from his or 
her father is dependent upon the relationship between his or her parents. 
Nevertheless, in a minority of states that have statutes defining the in-
heritance rights of posthumously conceived children, the legislatures chose 
not to limit the scope of those statutes to marital situations. For instance, 
Florida's statute focuses upon the father-child relationship and does not 
touch upon the marital status of the parents. 273 Thus, nothing in the statute 
indicates that a man cannot leave a provision in his will for the benefit of a 
posthumously conceived child born to a woman who was not his spouse. 274 
Further, the California legislature did not limit the application of its statute 
to married couples. 275 This approach is in line with the view that the right to 
inherit from his or her father belongs to the child, not to the mother. 276 
Virginia's approach to this issue is also worth noting. The provisions 
of the statute relevant to this discussion address the man's paternal obliga-
tions in three separate contexts. 277 First, if the conception and birth of the 
child occurs during the man's lifetime, he is legally recognized as the 
child's parent. 278 The marital status of the parties is relevant in that situa-
268 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.§ 2.5 cmt. I (1999) ("[T]o inherit from the decedent, a child 
produced from genetic material of the decedent by assisted reproductive technology must be born within 
a reasonable time after the decedent's death in circumstances indicating that the decedent would have 
approved of the child's right to inherit."). 
269 See FLA. STAT.§ 742.17 (West 2008); VA. CODE ANN.§ 20-158 (West 2008). 
270 Scott, supra note 38, at 966-67 (noting that technological advances have allowed parents to 
conceive several years after death). 
271 LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 9:391. l(A) (2008). 
272 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.§ 160.707 (Vernon 2008) (framing the rights of the deceased spouse as a 
parent). See also UTAH CODE ANN.§ 788-15-707 (2008) (same). 
273 SeeFLA.STAT.§742.17. 
274 See id. 
275 See CAL. PROB. CODE§ 249.5 (West 2008). 
276 See id. § 6400 (providing that the right to inherit belongs to a man's heir). 
277 See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158 (West 2008). 
278 Id.§ 20-158(A)(2). But see id.§ 20-158(c) (providing different rules in cases of divorce). 
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tion. Thus, if, while he is alive, the husband consents to the artificial in-
semination of his wife using his sperm or the sperm of another man, the 
child is recognized as his legitimate child. 279 That recognition gives the 
child the right to inherit from the man. The plain reading of the statute indi-
cates that a man who agrees to have his sperm used to inseminate a woman 
who is not his wife is not legally responsible for the child. 280 Therefore, in 
this context, the child's right to inherit is dependent upon the legal relation-
ship that exists between the child's parents. 
The second scenario addressed by the Virginia statute involves a situa-
tion where the child is conceived by artificial insemination using the man's 
sperm during his lifetime, but the child is born after the man's death. 281 The 
section applying to those types of cases specifically refers to the legal obli-
gations of spouses. 282 The third and most pertinent situation anticipated by 
Virginia's legislators deals with the obligations of the man when both the 
conception and birth occur after his death. 283 When the statute discusses 
posthumous conception, it uses broad language that encompasses circum-
stances involving unmarried persons. 284 With regard to a child posthu-
mously conceived, if the statutory procedures are followed, the man is the 
legal father of the child even if he was not married to the child's mother. 285 
E. Notice 
A notice requirement protects the reproductive rights of the deceased 
man by making it difficult for him to be classified as the legal father of the 
posthumously conceived child unless he consents to the child's conception. 
Further, it protects the man's right to control the distribution of his estate 
even in the absence of a will. The statutes enacted by both the California 
and Virginia legislatures have notice requirements that impact the rights of 
the posthumously conceived child. 286 Under the mandates of those statutes, 
279 Id § 20-l 58(A)(2). 
280 Id. § 20-l 58(A)(3) ("A donor is not the parent of a child conceived through assisted conception, 
unless the donor is the husband of the gestational mother."). 
281 Id.§ 20-158(8) ("Any child resulting from the insemination ofa wife's ovum using her hus-
band's sperm, with his consent, is the child of the husband and wife notwithstanding that, during the ten-
month period immediately preceding the birth, either party died."). 
282 VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(8). 
283 Id. ("However, any person who dies before implantation of an embryo ... whether or not the 
gamete is that of the person's spouse, is not the parent of any resulting child unless (i) implantation 
occurs before notice of the death can ... be communicated to the physician ... or (ii) the person con-
sents to be a parent in writing executed before implantation."). 
284 Id 
285 Id 
286 CAL. PROB. CODE§ 249.5(b)(West 2008); VA. CODE ANN.§ 20-158(8) (West 2008). 
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unless there is written consent on the part of the deceased man, notice must 
be given to an independent third party. 287 
1. Notice under the California Statute 
In California, written notice that the deceased's sperm may be used for 
posthumous conception must be given to the person in charge of adminis-
tering the deceased' s estate. 288 The notice must be given by the person au-
thorized to control the use of the dead man's sperm within four months of 
the man's death. 289 The purpose of the notice requirement appears to be to 
make sure that the executor of the man's estate knows that there might be 
another potential heir created. That information will assist the executor in 
planning the distribution of the man's estate. In addition, the notice re-
quirement promotes the state's interest in the orderly distribution of estates 
and also protects the interests of the posthumously conceived child by al-
lowing the executor to set aside some of the estate for that child. Further, 
the notice requirement protects the existing heirs by informing them of per-
sons who might have a potential claim against the estate, giving the existing 
heirs some idea of the amount of their inheritance. 
2. Notice under the Virginia Statute 
The Virginia statute appears to be designed to address two different 
sets of circumstances: (1) cases where the man does not sign a written con-
sent and the insemination is performed during his lifetime; and (2) cases 
where the man consents in writing to have his sperm used to create a child, 
and he dies before the insemination is performed. 290 In both cases, the man 
is considered to be the legal parent of the resulting child. Hence, the child 
has the right to inherit from the man. The notice requirement of the statute 
deals with the first scenario. For purposes of the Virginia statute, the man is 
considered to be alive until the physician performing the insemination 
287 CAL. PROB. CODE§ 249.5(b) (West 2008) (providing that the individual who has the power to 
control the distribution of the decedent's property or death benefits must receive written notice from the 
decedent that provides that his or her genetic material is available for posthumous conception); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 20-158(8) (West 2008) ("[T]he [decedent] consents to be a parent in writing executed 
before the implantation."). 
288 CAL. PROB. CODE ANN.§ 249.5(b). 
289 Id. ("The notice shall have been given to a person who has the power to control the distribution 
of either the decedent's property or death benefits ... within four months of the date ... of the dece-
dent's death."). 
290 VA. CODE ANN.§ 20-158(A) (discussing the general determination of parentage in cases of 
assisted conception); id § 20-158(8) (discussing parentage determinations upon the death of a spouse). 
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knows that he is dead. 291 Consequently, if the physician performs the in-
semination before being notified of the man's death, the insemination is 
treated as being performed during his lifetime. As a result, the posthu-
mously conceived child is recognized as his legal heir. Nevertheless, the 
Virginia statute appears to state that, absent written consent, if the physician 
knows or should know of the man's death, he cannot go forward with the 
procedure. 292 In that case, the procedure is treated as if it never occurred and 
the child does not have the right to inherit from the dead man. 
A key shortcoming of the notice requirement in the Virginia statute is 
that it might encourage persons to take steps to ensure that the physician is 
not notified of the man's death until it is too late to stop the procedure. This 
may be true in cases where a woman wants to conceive a child using a dead 
man's sperm for less than honorable reasons. In such a situation, the woman 
may be motivated to keep the physician in the dark about the procedure. 
The solution to the problem would be to strictly enforce the writing re-
quirement contained in the statute. Thus, the physician should not be able to 
perform the procedure without the man's written consent. 
F. Other Conditions 
Some state statutes place other conditions on the posthumously con-
ceived child's right to inherit. For example, the Louisiana statute gives the 
decedent's living heirs the opportunity to bring an action to disavow pater-
nity within a year of the birth of the child. 293 That provision gives the man's 
existing heirs the opportunity to demand proof that the posthumously con-
ceived child has a genetic connection to the deceased man. Some legisla-
tures may feel this provision has merit because it permits the existing heirs 
to speak for the man when he is no longer able to speak for himself. Hence, 
the existing heirs are able to protect their interests and those of the deceased 
man. On the other hand, permitting the existing heirs to challenge the pater-
nity of the posthumously conceived child may increase in-fighting among 
potential heirs. As a result, the probate process might become slower and 
more expensive. 
Each of the statutes discussed in this section has merit, and legislatures 
in these states have taken a step in the right direction. However, none of the 
statutes are comprehensive enough to enable the courts to address the legal 
consequences of the existence of posthumously conceived children. 
291 Id.§ 20-158(8) ("[I]mplantation occurs before notice of the death can reasonably be communi-
cated to the physician performing the procedure."). 
292 Id. 
293 LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 9:391.l(B) (2008). 
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IV. PROPOSAL 
The issue of the paternal inheritance rights of a posthumously con-
ceived child arises in two contexts. Scenario One: A man has his sperm 
removed and frozen prior to his death, and dies before his sperm is used to 
conceive a child. Or Scenario Two: A man dies, and then his sperm is ex-
tracted and used to conceive a child. 294 Both situations lead to the following 
two issues: (1) Whether the resulting child should have the opportunity to 
inherit from his or her father; and (2) What, if any, conditions should be 
placed on the child's right to inherit from his or her father. The answer to 
the first question should differ depending upon which scenario exists. The 
answer to the second question should be the same in both cases. In order to 
properly balance all of the competing interests, states that currently do not 
have statutes governing the inheritance rights of posthumously conceived 
children should adopt statutes that contain a written consent requirement, 
time restrictions, and other appropriate restrictions. States that currently 
have statutes covering posthumously conceived children should amend 
them accordingly if they do not already contain these essential elements. 
A. Opportunity to Inherit 
1. Scenario One 
If a man has his sperm removed and dies before the child is conceived, 
the posthumously conceived child should be presumed to be the legal heir 
of the dead man for intestacy purposes. The presumption should be rebut-
table in order to protect the rights of the man's living heirs. 295 Giving the 
posthumously conceived child the chance to inherit from his or her father 
will not infringe on the man's reproductive rights by forcing parental re-
sponsibilities on him. The man's reproductive rights are protected by some 
action taken by the man during life indicating that he wanted a child to be 
conceived using his sperm. The man's death should not prevent his repro-
294 See Janet Berry, Life After Death: Preservation of the Immortal Seed, 72 TuL. L. REV. 231, 
248-50 (I 997) (discussing the consequences of permitting sperm retrieval from a dead man). 
295 See Julie E. Goodwin, Not All Children Are Created Equal: A Proposal to Address Equal 
Protection Inheritance Rights of Posthumously Conceived Children, 4 CONN. PuB. INT. L.J. 234, 280 
(2005) ("Instead, there should be a presumption that when the decedent leaves his sperm specifically for 
the use of his surviving spouse, he intended to conceive a child after his death. The burden should be on 
the party seeking to preclude the child's inheritance to show the decedent did not intend to conceive 
after death."). 
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ductive wishes from being fulfilled. 296 Furthermore, if the man had his 
sperm removed when he was facing a life-threatening illness or a situation 
that would leave him sterile, that affirmative action indicates that the man 
had his sperm removed because he was contemplating the conception of a 
child or children using his sperm. 297 
At a minimum, unless contrary evidence is presented, the court should 
presume that the man would have wanted any child conceived posthu-
mously using his sperm to inherit from his estate. 298 This approach will not 
discount the man's reproductive rights because, after the withdrawal of his 
sperm, the man has the opportunity to change his mind and to have the 
stored sperm destroyed. For instance, the man could make arrangements to 
have the stored sperm destroyed during his lifetime or he could include a 
provision in his will ordering the destruction of his sperm. 299 The involve-
ment of a neutral third party in the withdrawal of the man's sperm reduces 
the possibility of fraud or misuse of the sperm. As Kievernagel indicates, 300 
if the man makes his wishes known, the courts will order the medical facil-
ity to comply with the instructions that he leaves regarding the use of his 
sperm. Litigation over the use of a dead man's sperm usually occurs when 
he does not leave clear instructions about the disposal of his sperm. 
2. Scenario Two 
In the situation where the man's sperm is extracted from his dead body 
and used to create a child, the child should also be given the opportunity to 
inherit from his or her father. 301 However, the burden should be on the liv-
296 See Sheri Gilbert, Note, Fatherhood from the Grave: An Analysis of Postmortem Insemination, 
22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 521, 550-54 (1993) (indicating that, after a man dies, his reproductive decisions 
may be limited by the state). 
297 See Scott, supra note 38, at 968 (citing Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 
269 (Mass. 2002)). 
298 Scharman, supra note 50, at 1025 (citing Robert J. Kerekes, My Child . .. But Not My Heir: 
Technology, the Law, and Post-Mortem Conception, 31 REAL. PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 213, 240 (1996) 
("It is illogical to assume that a decedent would desire to prevent a biological child from sharing in his 
estate.")). 
299 See Hecht v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 276, 289 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1993) (finding no reason to interfere with the decedent's decision regarding the use of his gametes 
after his death); see also Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. & Maureen McBrien, Posthumous Reproduction, 39 
FAM. L.Q. 579, 597 (2005) ("[P]otential problems can be avoided by creating thorough estate planning 
documents clearly outlining the intent of the parties."). 
3oo In re Estate of Kievemagel, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 311, 317-18 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that only 
the decedent has a right to the determination of the use of his sperm, which must be governed by his 
intent when this is clear). 
301 See Berry, supra note 294, at 232 ("The newest technology allows viable sperm to be surgically 
extracted from deceased males within twenty-four hours of their death."); see also id. at 248-49 (provid-
ing examples of sperm extractions conducted after death). 
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ing parent to prove that the man would have wanted the child to be con-
ceived using his sperm after his death. With regard to Scenario Two situa-
tions, state legislatures should make it more difficult for mothers to claim 
inheritance rights or other survivors' benefits for children who are inten-
tionally created using a dead man's sperm. 
Given the number of children who are neglected and in need of fam-
ily, 302 state legislatures should take into consideration the public policy ar-
gument against creating fatherless children. 303 Additionally, state legisla-
tures should be wary of women who may be motivated to create children to 
financially benefit from the man's estate. 304 Another public policy consid-
eration that state legislatures should take into account is the fact that most 
cases involving posthumously conceived children are Social Security cases; 
the Social Security system may be overburdened by the introduction of 
another new pool of potential beneficiaries. 
B. Conditions to Inherit 
The opportunity to inherit should not be a guarantee of inheritance 
rights. Thus, the living parent of the posthumously conceived child should 
have to satisfy certain conditions in order for the child to actually receive 
the right to inherit. 305 Those conditions should be geared toward protecting: 
(1) the interests of the posthumously conceived child; (2) the reproductive 
rights of the deceased man; (3) the interests of the man's other heirs; 
( 4) and the interests of the state. The conditions should apply in both Sce-
nario One and Scenario Two cases. 
1. Written Consent 
As most state statutes on this subject already provide, the posthu-
mously conceived child should not be able to inherit from the deceased man 
if the man did not consent in writing to the child's conception. Insisting that 
a woman have written consent from a man authorizing the use of his sperm 
to create a posthumously conceived child ensures that the man has seriously 
302 Kay P. Kindred, Of Child Welfare and Welfare Reform: The Implications for Children When 
Contradictory Policies Collide, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 413, 471 (2003). 
3o3 Star, supra note 37, at 624 (disputing that a posthumously conceived child may be harmed by 
being fatherless). 
304 In its 2008 season, the comedy television show Ugly Betty included a storyline about this issue. 
Ugly Betty: Bananas/or Betty (ABC television broadcast Dec. 6, 2007). See Knaplund, supra note 82, at 
634-36 (discussing some of the financial incentives for reproducing using a dead man's sperm); see also 
Karlin, supra note 33, at 1341. 
3o5 Gary, supra note 80, at 35; see also Gilbert, supra note 296, at 555-58 (providing suggestions 
for resolving the question of the inheritance rights of posthumously conceived children). 
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thought about the possibility that his sperm would be used to conceive a 
child after his death, protects against fraud, and creates a safe harbor which 
provides the man with the assurance that the court will carry out his wishes. 
Additionally, in the case of artificial insemination performed while the 
man is alive, some jurisdictions permit a man's consent to be presumed or 
implied. 306 In light of the fact that a deceased man will not be around to 
speak on his own behalf in the context of posthumous conception, the 
mother of the child should be required to acquire the man's written con-
sent. 307 If the woman does not produce proof of the man's written consent 
to the posthumous conception, the resulting child should not be able to in-
herit from his estate. 
There has been much dispute about whether a man's sperm should be 
recognized as property. 308 The written consent requirement should apply 
regardless of which view is adopted. If the court decides to treat the dead 
man's sperm as just another body part, it still should not be extracted with-
out written permission from the decedent. For example, a hospital does not 
harvest a person's organs unless that person has filled out an organ donor 
card or the hospital receives written consent from the person's next of 
kin. 309 The harvesting of sperm should be more restricted because sperm 
has the potential to create a human life that the deceased man's resources 
may be used to support. 310 In addition, the decision to be a parent is a per-
sonal one that should be made by the man during his lifetime. Conse-
quently, a man's sperm should not be extracted from his body posthu-
mously without some type of written permission from him. 
306 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., ESTATES & TRUSTS, § l-206(b) (West 2008); see also, e.g., In re 
Baby Doe, 353 S.E.2d 877, 879 (S.C. 1987) (citing R.S. v. RS., 670 P.2d 923, 926 (Kan. Ct. App. 
1983) ("Husband's consent to his wife's impregnation by artificial insemination may be express, or it 
may be implied from conduct which evidences knowledge of the procedure and failure to object.")). 
307 See K.S. v. G.S., 440 A.2d 64, 66 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1981); see also In re Marriage of 
Witbeck-Wildhagen, 667 N.E.2d 122, 125-26 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (holding that it is against public policy 
to require a man to provide financial support for a child that his wife conceives by artificial insemination 
without his consent); Rowsell, supra note 55, at 409. 
308 Jennifer Long Collins, Note, Hecht v. Superior Court: Recognizing a Property Right in Repro-
ductive Material, 33 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 661, 673c78 (1995); see also Bonnie Steinbock, Sperm 
as Property, 6 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 57, 57, 66 (1995). But see John A. Robertson, Posthumous Re-
production, 69 IND. L.J. 1027, 1038-39 (1994) (citing Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 793 P.2d 
479, 489 (Cal. 1990) (discussing different viewpoints about the treatment of body parts, especially 
sperm, as property)). 
3o9 Kristin Cook, Familial Consent/or Registered Organ Donors: A Legally Rejected Concept, 17 
HEALTH MATRIX 117, 121-22 (2007); see also Lloyd R. Cohen, Increasing the Supply of Transplant 
Organs: The Virtues of a Futures Market, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. I, 19 (1989). 
31 0 Bruce Wilder, Posthumous and Post-Incompetency Reproduction: Legal Ramifications for 
Family Law and/or the Law of Probate, 13 DIVORCE LITIG. 57, 58 (2001). 
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The court in Hecht 311 indicated sperm should be treated as property a 
man can dispose of in his will. In jurisdictions that choose to follow that 
approach, the written consent requirement is still appropriate. Distribution 
by a written instrument signed by the decedent is the law's preferred me-
thod of disposing of property. 312 The courts and legislatures recognize that a 
man should have the right to dispose of his property in accordance with his 
wishes. 313 Thus, if a man leaves a will, the court will take steps to honor the 
instructions that he includes in that instrument. If the man dies without exe-
cuting a will, the intestacy system is in place to distribute his property in a 
manner consistent with his presumed intent. 314 Consequently, a posthu-
mously conceived child should only have the right to inherit from a man's 
estate if the man intended to have his sperm used to create that child. The 
most reliable indicator of that intent is a written instrument evidencing the 
man's consent to the posthumous conception. 
Despite its obvious advantages, the writing requirement has some 
drawbacks. In some states, the statutory language is too broad to provide 
the court and the parties with much guidance. For instance, the general lan-
guage contained in the statutes enacted by the legislatures of Louisiana, 
Virginia, and UP A jurisdictions may result in increased litigation. 315 A 
woman who wants to comply with the statute may have to go to court prior 
to the death of the man to ensure that his signed writing complies with the 
statutory requirements. Bringing the action at the beginning of the process 
makes sense because the man will be able to rectify the situation if the court 
does not approve of his efforts to satisfy the statutory writing requirement. 
The general language of the statutes also gives the existing heirs the oppor-
tunity to object to any writing submitted by the mother of the posthumously 
conceived child. As a limited jurisdiction court, the probate court is already 
overloaded. 316 The legislatures should lessen the court's burden by giving 
clearer statutory mandates. 
In contrast to the general language used in Virginia, Louisiana, and 
elsewhere, the writing requirements of Florida and California are too strin-
gent. 317 In Florida, the posthumously conceived child can only inherit if his 
311 Hecht v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 283 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1993). 
312 Frances H. Foster, The Family Paradigm of Inheritance Law, 80 N.C. L. REV. 199, 212-13 
(200 I) (noting that courts allegedly abhor intestacy). 
313 See Christine A. Djalleta, Comment, A Twinkle in a Decedent's Eye: Proposed Amendments to 
the Uniform Probate Code in Light of New Reproductive Technology, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 335, 341 (1994) 
(citing Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 718 (1987)). 
314 Melissa Aubin, Comment, Defying Classification: Intestacy Issue for Transsexual Surviving 
Spouses, 82 OR. L. REV. 1155, 1172 (2003). 
315 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1 (2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-8.I (West 2008); UNIF. 
PARENTAGE ACT§ 707 (2008). 
316 Gary, supra note 71, at 653. 
317 CAL. PROB. CODE§ 249.5 (West 2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 2008). 
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or her father provides for the child in a will. 318 A substantial number of peo-
ple die without leaving wills. 319 The children of those people are protected 
by the intestacy system. 320 The states do not punish children because their 
parents die intestate. That makes sense from a public policy perspective 
because a child cannot force his or her parents to draft a will. The Florida 
will requirement treats posthumously conceived children differently from 
other children.321 If a child were born posthumously, Florida would permit 
that child to inherit under the state's intestacy system without requiring any 
action from the father. 322 The California statute does not require that the 
man leave a will. 323 However, the writing mandated by the statute contains 
most of the formalities of a will. Thus, the California statute places as much 
of a hardship on the posthumously conceived child as the Florida statute. 
In light of all of these considerations, states looking to adopt a strin-
gent statute governing the inheritance rights of posthumously conceived 
children should take the following issues into consideration. 
a. Ensuring Adequate Consideration 
The writing requirement, like a will, serves several useful purposes. 324 
Requiring a writing forces a man to give serious consideration to his deci-
sion to agree to permit the use of his genetic material to create a child. The 
ritual of reading and signing a document usually impresses upon the person 
that he is making an important, and often binding, commitment. 325 There-
fore, he will be able to give informed consent to the procedure. Given the 
legal responsibilities that spring from conceiving a child, it is critical that 
the decision is not hastily made. The writing requirement also serves an 
evidentiary function. 326 The writing signed by the man will serve as a reli-
able source of proof. As a result, when the woman petitions the probate 
court on behalf of the posthumously conceived child, she will be able to 
318 FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 742.17. 
31 9 Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Honor Thy Father and Mother?: How Intestacy Law Goes Too Far in 
Protecting Parents, 3 7 SETON HALL L. REV. 171, 172 (2006). 
320 Mahoney, supra note 73, at 920. 
321 FLA.STAT.ANN.§742.17. 
322 Id. § 732. I 06 ("Heirs of the decedent conceived before his or her death, but born thereafter, 
inherit intestate property as if they had been born in the decedent's lifetime."). 
323 CAL. PROB. CODE§ 249.5 (West 2008). 
324 See James Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirement for Wills, 68 N.C. L. REV. 541, 
544 (1990) (discussing policies behind the will formalities, including the writing requirement). 
325 Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 
I, 5 (1941). See also Emily Sherwin, Clear and Convincing Evidence of Testamentary Intent: The 
Search for a Compromise Between Formality and Adjudicative Justice, 34 CONN. L. REV. 453, 455-57 
(2002). 
326 John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489, 493 
(1975). 
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prove that the man consented to the conception of the child. Since the 
events all take place after the man is dead, a writing signed by his hand is 
the best available evidence of his wishes. 327 
b. Protecting Against Fraud 
Moreover, the writing requirement serves a protective function. 328 It 
enables the probate court to function smoothly by reducing the number of 
fraudulent claims that are filed. It also protects the reproductive rights of 
the deceased man by not making him responsible for a child unless he 
agreed in writing to the conception. The writing provides a safeguard 
against the misuse of frozen sperm. 329 The man may have frozen his sperm 
to use at a later time in his life. He may not want the sperm to be used to 
create a child that he will never know. 
c. Creating a Safe Harbor to Honor the Deceased's Wishes 
The final function of the writing requirement is to create a safe harbor 
that provides the man with the assurance that the court will carry out his 
wishes. 330 The probate court is supposed to bring about the presumed intent 
of the decedent when it comes to distributing his property. 331 The writing 
requirement provides the court with the directions it needs to perform that 
task. This is especially true in Florida where the writing requirement can 
only be satisfied by a will. 332 The man's right to decide if he wants to be 
financially responsible for a child is protected because if he does not pro-
vide for the posthumously conceived child in his will, the child is not his 
heir. This is consistent with the manner in which the testacy system treats 
all children. A man has a right to disinherit his existing children, 333 so he 
should have the right not to provide for his posthumously conceived child. 
The writing requirement is fair to all of the parties impacted by the 
birth of the posthumously conceived child. It promotes the state's interests 
327 Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, From Cradle to Tomb: Estate Planning Considerations of the New 
Procreation, 57 LA. L. REV. 27, 51 (1996). 
328 Lloyd Bonfield, Reforming the Requirements for Due Execution of Wills: Some Guidance from 
the Past, 70 TuL. L. REV. 1893, 1907 (1996). 
329 John A. Robertson, Precommitment Issues in Bioethics, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1849, 1874 (2003). 
330 C. Douglas Miller, Will Formality, Judicial Formalism, and Legislative Reform: An Examina-
tion of the New Uniform Probate Code "Harmless Error" Rule and the Movement Toward Amorphism, 
43 FLA. L. REY. 167, 269 (1991). 
331 Gary, supra note 71, at 651. 
332 FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 742.17 (West 2008). 
333 Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritance and the Modem Family, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REY. 83, 84-85 
(1994). 
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in making sure that the financial needs of minor children are met. Prior to 
the child's birth, the writing requirement permits the state to have a person 
it can hold responsible for the support of the child. If the man gives written 
consent for the child to be conceived, that writing can be used by the state 
to obtain financial support for the child from the man's estate or his Social 
Security benefits. 334 The writing requirement helps the child by giving him 
or her tangible proof of paternity. That proof can be presented to the pro-
bate court or the Social Security Administration on behalf of the child. The 
writing requirement also protects the existing heirs by reducing the number 
of persons who can make a claim against the man's estate. The writing re-
quirement creates a bright-line rule. If the child does not have the requisite 
written authorization, he or she does not have a right to inherit from the 
man's estate. 
In order to satisfy the written consent requirement, the writing does 
not have to be formal. There are several options available that would not be 
unduly burdensome on the man and his family. The legislature could create 
a statutory consent form that the man could fill out authorizing the use of 
his sperm to conceive a child prior to or after his death. 
Another option is for the medical facility withdrawing the man's 
sperm to provide a form for him to fill out prior to the procedure. 335 Cur-
rently, before surgery or admittance to a hospital, patients are asked to fill 
out numerous types of forms, including living wills. 336 Therefore, it would 
not be a burden for the hospital to generate another type of form to cover 
situations involving extraction of sperm. In fact, some states already require 
a licensed physician to obtain a consent form from a woman's husband be-
fore inseminating her with donor sperm. Those states could amend their 
statutes to require the woman to present a written consent form signed by 
the deceased man prior to releasing his previously stored sperm to the 
woman or removing sperm from the man's dead body. In addition, the man 
could be encouraged to leave provisions in his will for the distribution of 
his sperm to the woman he wants to use it to conceive his child. 337 
334 In the comments to its statute, the Louisiana legislature indicated that it gave posthumously 
conceived children the right to inherit under the intestacy system so that they could qualify for Social 
Security survivors' benefits. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1 cmt. (2003 & 2008). 
335 See, e.g., Rowsell, supra note 55, at 406; Stevenson-Popp, supra note 159, at 752n.134. 
336 Carson Strong, Consent to Sperm Retrieval and Insemination after Death or Persistent Vegeta-
tive State, 14 J.L. & HEALTH 243, 260 (1999) (proposing modifying living wills and durable powers of 
attorney to serve as evidence of consent for sperm withdrawal and artificial insemination). 
337 Michael K. Elliott, Tales of Parenthood from the Crypt: The Predicament of the Posthumously 
Conceived Child, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 47, 65 (2004). 
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2. Time Restrictions 
It is very important that the probate court close the estates of decedents 
as quickly and efficiently as possible. 338 Therefore, in order to inherit, the 
posthumously conceived child should have to be conceived within a certain 
time period. 339 The time restrictions imposed by the Louisiana and the Cali-
fornia systems are fair to all the parties involved. 340 The time frame permit-
ted affords the woman the opportunity to conceive and give birth to the 
child. A shorter time period would be unrealistic because it typically takes 
several fertility treatments for the woman to conceive. 341 In addition, the 
woman may have a miscarriage or other complications. The two to three 
year window of opportunity gives the woman more than one chance to con-
ceive using the dead man's sperm. A longer time period would not be fair 
to the existing heirs. They should not have to wait indefinitely to receive an 
inheritance. The Restatement approach permits flexibility because the court 
can determine what is a "reasonable" amount of time based upon the cir-
cumstances of a particular case. 342 However, the "reasonable" language is 
so vague it may not promote judicial economy because the court might be 
constantly called upon to decide if the child was born within a reasonable 
period of time. 
A specific time should be stated in order for the child to be conceived. 
After that time period has expired, the class of the decedent's heirs should 
be closed. The time limit should be long enough to give the woman a realis-
tic opportunity to conceive and give birth. 343 Nonetheless, the time period 
should be short enough to prevent numerous additional heirs from being 
conceived and to allow the existing heirs to receive their inheritance in a 
timely manner. The time frame can be based upon the average time it takes 
to probate an estate of that size in that jurisdiction. 
338 Goodwin, supra note 295, at 274. 
339 See Joshua Greenfield, Note, Dad Was Born a Thousand Years Ago? An Examination of Post-
Mortem Conception and Inheritance, With a Focus on the Rule Against Perpetuities, 8 MINN. J.L. SCI. 
& TECH. 277, 291-92 (2007) (discussing guidelines to be considered when selecting a time period for 
the posthumously conceived child to be born). 
340 LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 9:391.1 (2008); CAL. PROB. CODE§ 249.5 (West 2008). 
341 Lori B. Andrews & Lisa Douglass, Alternative Reproduction, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 623, 655 
(1991) (discussing success rates of reproductive procedures); see also Monica Shah, Commentary, 
Modem Reproductive Technologies: Legal Issues Concerning Cryopreservation and Posthumous Con-
ception, 17 1. LEGAL MED. 547, 549 (1994); Chester, supra note 116, at 52 (discussing the disadvan-
tages of a one-year limitations period for the posthumously conceived child to be created). 
342 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY§ 15.l (2004). 
343 See Knaplund, supra note 82, at 652. 
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3. Other Limitations 
Unlike existing statutes, newly created state statutes dealing with the 
inheritance rights of posthumously conceived children should apply to situ-
ations involving both married and unmarried persons. Statutes that are not 
limited to married couples are broad enough to cover most circumstances. 
Therefore, under those types of statutes, more posthumously conceived 
children will have the opportunity to inherit from their fathers. Hence, this 
approach appears to be in the best interests of the posthumously conceived 
children. However, there are other interests that must be balanced. 
Nothing in any of the existing state statutes limits the number of times 
that a man can consent to the afterdeath use of his genetic material to con-
ceive a child. 344 Consequently, it is conceivable that several different wom-
en can use the man's sperm to conceive children after he dies. The end re-
sult could be numerous heirs filing claims against the man's estate. This 
would put a strain on the probate court and it would be unfair to the man's 
existing heirs. Therefore, the legislatures need some way to control the 
number of children posthumously conceived using a man's sperm. One way 
to achieve that task is to limit the pool of persons who have the right to cre-
ate a man's heir after his death to his spouse. That decision makes sense 
because it is reasonable for a man to want his widow to bear his child. In 
addition, only permitting spouses to file claims against a man's estate will 
promote judicial economy. 
Notwithstanding the benefits of restricting the application of the stat-
utes to only spouses, that approach has some serious drawbacks. First, it is 
out of step with the evolution of the American family. More and more per-
sons are choosing to have long-term committed relationships without the 
benefit of marriage, as recognized by the court in Hecht. 345 Even though 
Hecht was not Kane's wife, the court acknowledged his right to leave her 
his sperm so that she could conceive his child after he died. 346 By only giv-
ing a married man the right to consent to the posthumous use of his sperm, 
the legislatures disregarded the wishes of men in long-term committed rela-
tionship. 
Additionally, the statutes appear to punish posthumously conceived 
children whose parents chose not to marry before their conception. When 
legislatures enacted statutes that deprived non-marital children of the op-
portunity to inherit from their fathers, the United States Supreme Court 
344 But see Khabbaz v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 930 A.2d 1180 (N.H. 2007) (limiting use 
through IVF forms). 
345 See Hecht v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 285 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1993). 
346 Id. at 287. 
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found those statutes to be unconstitutional. 347 As a result, because death 
ends the marriage, a child conceived posthumously has a great deal in 
common with a non-marital child. Thus, a similar Equal Protection argu-
ment can be made on behalf of the posthumously conceived children of 
unmarried couples. That argument might be successful because there ap-
pears to be no compelling reason to treat those children differently from the 
posthumously conceived children of married couples. 
CONCLUSION 
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have impacted the country in nu-
merous ways. There is a possibility that actions taken by some service 
members fighting in these wars will have an impact on family law in Amer-
ica. Prior to being deployed, military men and women are choosing to have 
their genetic material frozen. 348 Thus, the men and women who do not sur-
vive the war still have the possibility of reproducing children. Courts will 
have to decide how to distribute the veteran benefits and other assets left 
behind by those persons. To insure that the probate system operates 
smoothly and fairly, state legislatures must enact comprehensive statutes 
that focus on the inheritance rights of posthumously conceived children. In 
particular, as long as the possibility exists for a dead man to reproduce, the 
courts and the legislatures must take steps to address the rights of the result-
ing children. Any system put in place must balance the interests of the 
state, 349 the existing heirs, the decedent, and the posthumously conceived 
child. To guarantee a fair balance, state legislatures must give posthu-
mously conceived children the opportunity to inherit from their deceased 
fathers. Nonetheless, the opportunity to inherit should not be a right to in-
herit. State legislatures should only give posthumously conceived children 
the chance to inherit from their father's estate if the circumstances of their 
births satisfy certain conditions, and successfully balances the competing 
interests of the state, the posthumously conceived child, other living heirs, 
and the father's wishes to procreate, or not procreate, another child after his 
death. 
347 Richard F. Storrow, The Policy of Family Privacy: Uncovering the Bias in Favor of Nuclear 
Families in American Constitutional Law and Policy Reform, 66 Mo. L. REV. 527, 594-98 (2001). 
348 Greenfield, supra note 339, at 282; see also VanCannon, supra note 48, at 361. 
349 Banks, supra note 112, at 296-97 (discussing state interests involved including whether to give 
posthumously conceived children the opportunity to inherit). 
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